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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
High availability is a key requirement in mobile communication systems, 
especially, when it is used for mission-critical services such as public safety e.g. 
police, ambulance and fire services. A failure in the fixed network infrastructure 
that provides services to mobile users can affect a large number of users and 
risk loss of lives. The fixed infrastructure of mobile communication system has 
different characteristics, for example, architecture complexity, real-time peer-to-
peer communication and performance requirements that make the already 
existing failure recovery techniques, such as those using rollback or replication 
techniques inapplicable. 
This dissertation presents a novel failure recovery approach based on a 
behavioral model of the communication protocols. The new recovery method is 
able to deal with software and hardware faults and is particularly suitable for 
mobile communications infrastructure. The method enables the faulty 
applications in the infrastructure to quickly and effectively resume their services 
to their mobile clients with no or minimal loss of work after failure.   
In our approach, we do not assume a specific fault behavior for example fail-
stop or transient behavior as it is the case for many recovery techniques. In 
addition, the method does not require any modification to mobile clients. The 
Communicating Extended Finite State Machine (CEFSM) is used to model the 
behavior of the infrastructure applications. The model-based recovery scheme is 
integrated in the application and uses the client/server model to save the 
application state information during failure-free execution on a stable storage 
and retrieve them when needed during recovery. When and what information to 
be saved/retrieved is determined by the behavioral model of the application.  
To practically evaluate and demonstrate the effectiveness of our 
method, we developed as a case study an experimental testbed for the TETRA 
(TErrestrial Trunked Radio) packet data network. The testbed works as a 
distributed system and can run various communication scenarios between the 
fixed network infrastructure and its mobile users. We thoroughly followed the 
TETRA standard specifications in our implementation of the communication 
protocols in order to get a testbed system that operates as the real system with 
respect to message exchange and timing. The experimental results showed that 
by using our method the faulty infrastructure application can immediately 
resume its service after its restart and in less than a minute, it restores its service 
performance level prior to the failure. The failure-free overhead incurred by the 
method is relatively low, and is experimentally found to be less than 5% in the 
conducted experiments.    
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RESUME 
 
Høj tilgængelighed er et nøgle-krav til mobilkommunikationssystemer, 
i særdeleshed når de anvendes til livsvigtige opgaver som offentlig sikkerhed, 
f.eks. politi, ambulance- og brandtjeneste. En fejl i infrastrukturen af det faste 
netværk, som tilbyder mobile brugere tjenester, kan påvirke et stort antal 
brugere med risiko for tab af menneskeliv. I sammenligning med det faste 
netværk har infrastrukturen i mobilkommunikationssystemer helt andre 
karakteristika, så som kompleksiteten af arkitekturen, realtid peer-to-peer trafik 
og krav om ydelser. Dette gør, at man ikke kan anvende eksisterende 
genetablerings teknikker som tilbage-rulning eller Duplikering. 
Denne afhandling præsenterer en ny genetablerings metode, der er 
baseret på kommunikations protokollernes adfærd. Denne nye metode er i stand 
til at tolerere fejl i både programmél og maskinél og er i særdeleshed egnet til 
de forhold, der hersker for mobilkommunikation. Metoden gør det muligt 
hurtigt og effektivt at genetablere de af fejl i infrastrukturen ramte tjenester til 
de mobile kunder men ingen eller et minimalt tab af arbejde. I modsætning til 
mange andre genetableringsteknikker stiller vores metode ikke specifikke krav 
til den måde, fejl opfører sig på, så som ophør af fejl eller forbigående fejl. 
Endvidere kræver metoden ingen modifikation af de mobile enheder. Den 
kommunikerende-udvidede-begrænsede-tilstands-maskine  (Communicating 
Extended Finite State Machine, CEFSM) anvendes til at modellere opførslen af 
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de infrastruktur programmerer som servicerer mobiler. Den model-baserede 
genetablerings metode er integreret i selv programmet. Den bruger klient/server 
modellen til at gemme oplysninger om programmets tilstand i fejlfrie perioder 
og hente dem frem igen, når de skal bruges til genetablering. Oplysninger 
gemmes i en pålidelig opbevaring plads. Hvilke oplysninger der skal gemmes, 
og hvornår de skal gemmes/hentes, fastlægges ved hjælp af modellen for 
programmets tjeneste adfærd. 
For at vurdere og underbygge vores metodes effektivitet i praksis, har vi 
som eksempel opbygget en eksperimentel forsøgsmodel af TETRA (TErrestrial 
Trunked Radio) pakkekoblede  datanet. Forsøgsmodellen fungerer som et 
distribueret system og kan afvikle forskellige scenarier for kommunikationen 
mellem det faste  nets infrastruktur og dets mobile brugere. For at få en 
forsøgsmodel, der fungerer som det virkelige system med hensyn til 
informationsudveksling og tidsmæssigt forløb, fulgte vi ved implementeringen 
af kommunikations protokollerne omhyggeligt specifikationerne for TETRA 
standarden. De eksperimentelle resultater viser, at med vores metode kan en i 
infrastrukturen fejlramt tjeneste efter genstart reetableres til samme niveau som 
før fejlen indtraf i løbet af få sekunder. Den ekstra belastning, som metoden 
medfører i fejlfrie perioder, er ret lille, og i alle eksperimenter har den været 
mindre end fem procent.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
In building public safety communication systems that aim to tolerate 
failure, system developers must tackle many difficult issues. For example, there 
is the issue of which failure recovery approach that can work best for the 
system? What type of faults should the system tolerate? Does the system 
performance or real-time requirements deteriorate during failure-free execution? 
What is the cost of adding fault tolerance to the system? By systemically 
building a method to tolerate failures caused by software and hardware faults, 
we endeavor with this study to illuminate many of these issues. 
 
1.1 Motivation 
Mobile communication is a key element for the success of the public 
safety work and it is a necessary tool in solving the day-to-day mission-critical 
tasks accomplished by   public safety services such as ambulance services, fire 
brigades and police forces. The public safety workers are expected to provide 
prompt assistance in dealing with situations to preserve life, health and security. 
It is therefore very important that the public safety services have reliable and 
highly available mobile communication infrastructure in place to support the 
needs of the public. 
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In the last four decades, researchers have developed different 
techniques to tolerate system failures. There are three main approaches used to 
develop these techniques: 
1. Rollback: In this approach, the state of the application is saved 
periodically during failure-free execution to a stable storage. In case of 
failure, the faulty application is rolled back to the latest saved state and 
tries to recover from there. 
2. Replication: In this approach, the application (mainly server) is 
replicated and distributed across different computers. The idea behind 
this approach is that the failure of one server replica (or of a computer 
hosting a replica) can be masked from any client using that server 
because the other replicas can continue to perform any operation that 
the client requires from the faulty server. 
3. Design diversity:  This approach is based on the use of two or more 
versions of the application that are built independently (i.e. different 
designers, different programming languages, different development 
tools, etc.) from the same specifications. The rational for this approach 
is that the different versions fail independently because it is unlikely to 
have faults at exactly the same place in all versions, and thus, the 
probability of having at least one running application at any time is very 
high.   
 
Unfortunately, these approaches suffer from different limitations that 
restrict their use in commercial communication systems, for example, 
because of implementation cost or some inadequate assumptions about the 
causes to failures. In addition, mobile communication systems have many 
specific requirements such as real-time and performance requirements that 
seriously challenge the applicability of these approaches in mobile 
environment.  In communication industry today, most of the system 
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suppliers have their own customized solutions and approaches to deal with 
their systems failures. These solutions and approaches are based on best 
practice rather than on scientific studies.  
    
Our goal with this thesis is to develop a failure recovery method that 
gives a realistic solution for achieving fault tolerance in real-world 
communications systems. We are particularly interested in mission-critical 
public safety communication systems because of the obvious need for 
continuous service availability. The proposed recovery method should improve 
the system availability through fast and reliable recovery.  The method should 
also meet the requirements of today’s enterprise such as low implementation 
cost, good scalability, low overhead during failure-free execution, etc. 
  
1.2 Scope and contributions 
This dissertation details our research work to develop a failure recovery 
method to achieve high availability in mobile communication infrastructure. We 
investigate the challenges that in mobile environment create for the recovery 
and try to develop a scientific and engineering quality solution. 
The path we take in our work cuts a broad swath through traditional 
systems and fault tolerance research. We look at the existing recovery 
approaches and explain their general limitations. We then describe the 
characteristics of mobile communication and their impact on the recovery 
approach.  We begin by constructing a model that formally describes the 
behavior of the mobile communication protocols. The behavioral model is then 
used in our development of the failure recovery method. Finally, we implement 
an experimental testbed for real-world TETRA packet data communication 
system to evaluate our proposed method. Our work led to the following 
contributions:  
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1. Adaptation of the CEFSM model to the OSI model in order to get a 
more accurate behavioral model of the communication protocols which 
are normally designed according to the OSI model. 
2.  Studying fault tolerance in a new application area, namely the fixed 
infrastructure of mobile communication system. The fixed 
infrastructure manages and provides services to the mobile stations.  To 
the best of our knowledge there is no academic literature that deals with 
failure recovery in the fixed infrastructure but there is few for mobile 
stations, e.g. [Pradhan96].     
3. Applying the CEFSM model on a real-world case study, namely 
TETRA packet data communication system. We show how behavioral 
model can be developed for the layered communication protocol stack.   
4. Developing a novel behavioral model based failure recovery method to 
tolerate software and hardware faults. This recovery method referred to 
as State Transition Based Recovery (STBR) is aimed to achieve high 
availability in the mobile fixed network infrastructure. The method is 
well suited for real-time communication and do not rely on any specific 
fault behavior e.g. transient or fail-stop.     
5. Design and implementation of an experimental testbed for TETRA 
packet data where the communication between mobile users and 
infrastructure can be generated at various traffic profiles.  
 
1.3 Dissertation Overview 
In this dissertation, we gradually assemble the pieces needed to first 
develop our novel failure recovery method for mobile communication systems, 
and secondly to implement an experimental testbed to evaluate the proposed 
method. 
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In chapter 2, we present the most known recovery techniques in the 
field of fault tolerance research. We describe in general the basic ideas and 
approaches behind these techniques. Finally, we explain their general 
limitations as a result of the assumptions made by these approaches.  
In chapter 3, we look at the overall architecture of mobile 
communication systems and the different aspects that characterize mobile 
communication and its physical environment. We then investigate the 
implications of these characteristics on the existing recovery techniques and 
finally come to a number of requirements that should be considered when 
building recovery system for mobile environment. 
In chapter 4, we start by presenting a modified version of the CEFSM 
model that is adapted to the OSI model. We then introduce our case study about 
TETRA and describe the protocol stack of TETRA packet data.  Finally, the 
CEFSM model is applied to a selected layer protocol entity in the TETRA 
packet data protocol stack. 
In chapter 5, we present our failure recovery method. The principles 
that the method relies on, the objective and the assumptions are described in 
details. Furthermore, the protocol entity modeled in previous chapter is used to 
explain the recovery mechanism both during failure free execution and during 
recovery.  
In chapter 6, the design and implementation of the experimental testbed 
for TETRA packet data is described. The experiment procedure and setup is 
also described. Finally, the results of the conducted experiments are presented 
and evaluated. 
In chapter 7, we conclude our work and discuss the possibility of 
adopting our research in commercial systems.  
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1.4 Terminology 
The fundamental terms used in the field of fault-tolerance research are 
fault, error, failure, detection and recovery. The terminology used in this thesis 
is to some extent in line with that given by [Gray91] and [Pradhan95]. 
 
Figure 1 A generic time line from fault to recovery 
A fault is a physical defect that may lead to an error. Faults can be 
classified into different types such as:  
Hardware faults:  component failures, for example disk crashes or processor 
failures 
Software faults: faults in software e.g. coding mistakes or improper design 
Human faults: mistakes made by operators and maintenance personnel, for 
example making an erroneous change to a configuration file, or performing a 
failed upgrade. 
Environmental faults: failure in facilities e.g. fire, flood, earthquake, power 
failure and sabotage.  
In case of software, faults are activated or triggered when the faulty piece of 
code is executed. The fault activation rate measures how often faults are 
triggered.  
An error is an erroneous change in the system state caused by the activation of 
the fault. It is a deviation from the correct behavior of a system. Fault is the root 
cause of error and error may cause failure.   
Time 
Detection latency Error latency 
                 Fault        Error                  Failure                 Detection   Recovery  
              Activation 
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A failure is the nonperformance or incorrect performance of some action that is 
expected of the system by the user. 
Error latency is the time between error occurrence and the failure occurrence, 
see Figure 1. 
Failure detection is the process of identifying that the system is in failed state. 
There are different failure detection mechanisms that can work both locally (e.g. 
by using watchdog timers) and remotely (e.g. by using periodic heartbeat 
messages) to monitor the system state. 
Failure detection latency is the time between the failure occurrence and its 
detection by the deployed detection mechanism.  
Failure recovery is the process of getting the system back to an operational state 
after a failure has been detected. 
 
To illustrate the above mentioned terminology, a simple C code example 
containing out-of-bounds array indexing fault is presented in Figure 2. The fault 
is located at line code number 5 ( should be replaced by<), the fault is 
activated when line 9 is executed with parameter i equals to 100 which takes 
place when the user list is full. The fault activation will lead to writing the 
number out of the array bounds, precisely at address “&user_list[100]”. 
The fault activation will cause an error if the memory address 
“&user_list[100]” is already used by another variable in the program, for 
example if the compiler uses this address for the variable number_of_users, 
otherwise no error occurs. Suppose that an error is indeed occurred (i.e. 
number_of_users gets corrupted) then depending on the program flow, if the 
number_of_users is used before being overwritten then program failure is 
inevitable, but if it is always overwritten before being used then failure is 
avoided. The possible failure will occur at line 22 where the program depending 
on the error value may hang for a variable period of time or probably crash. 
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Figure 2: An example of out-of-bounds array indexing in C code  
 
Error latency is the time period between the execution of line 9 with parameter i 
equals to 100 and the following execution of line 22. Note that error latency is a 
variable that may depend on the program user activity.  The failure detection 
latency is the time period between the execution of line 22 and the detection of 
failure by the used detection techniques, e.g. via heartbeats and watchdog 
timers.  
Finally, there are two important properties for software faults that have been 
essential for many of the failure recovery methods [Chandra00a]. 
Non-Determinism: This property indicates that fault activation is non-
deterministic (transient) and it is most likely not to happen if the operation is 
retried, even if the same piece of code is retried.  The transient nature of the 
#define MAX_NUM_OF_USERS  100 
int  user_list[MAX_NUM_OF_USERS]; 
int  number_of_users 
      
1 Save_user_id_number(int id_number) 
2 { 
3   int i; 
4   /* save Id number in first empty element */ 
5    for ( i= 0; i  MAX_NUM_OF_USERS;i++) 
6    { 
7 if(user_list[i] == 0) 
8 { 
9    user_list[i] = id_number; 
 
 
  } 
20 send_to_all_users( ) 
21{ 
22 while(number_of_user--) 
 { 
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fault arises because some external factors have unexpectedly changed; for 
example, a race condition caused by unusual thread/process scheduling or a bit-
flip (a change from 0 to 1 or 1 to 0) in RAM caused by electromagnetic 
interference. The non-deterministic software faults are also known as 
“Heisenbugs” [Gray86]. The faults that do not uphold the non-deterministic 
property are known as permanent faults. 
      
Fail-stop property: A program must not perform erroneous actions after 
fault activation, for example writing erroneous data which corrupts its own 
process state or sending incorrect information to other processes. This property 
is also known as halt-on-failure. The faults that do not uphold fail-stop property 
is called Byzantine faults [Schneider84]. 
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Chapter 2  
Fault Tolerance: Recovery techniques & limitations 
Traditionally, fault tolerance means to avoid service failures in the presence of 
faults. The goal of fault tolerance is to mask or at least to minimize the impact 
of system failures on system users. Fault tolerance is a means to achieve high 
level of system availability. In this chapter, we describe the key principles to 
build fault tolerant system and the main existing techniques to achieve fault 
tolerance. Finally, the limitations of these techniques are explained. 
2.1 Availability and Reliability 
Reliability and availability are two metrics that are always related with fault 
tolerance. 
Reliability is the probability that a system will not fail at a specified point of 
time in the future given that it is operating correctly at time zero. Module 
reliability measures the time from an initial instant and the next failure event. 
Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) is used to statistically quantified 
reliability. MTBF is the mean (average) time expected between failures of a 
given module (software or hardware) and is normally measured in hours. 
Because the calculation of MTBF is quite complex and may depend on many 
factors, it is usually done empirically to predict the rate at which failures can be 
expected.     
In contrast, availability is the probability that the system will be operating 
correctly at any instant of time within a given time interval. A widely accepted 
equation for system availability is A = MTBF/(MTBF+MTTR), where MTTR  ( 
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Mean Time To Repair)  is the average time between failure and recovery. An 
ideal system that never fails has availability equals to 1. Availability measures 
the readiness for correct service, while reliability measures the continuity of 
correct service.  
Depending on the criticality level of the user application, the requirements for 
system reliability and availability may vary. For example, in mission-critical 
applications such as emergency services, the main concern is a high level of 
availability; few numbers of outages per year can be tolerated as long as they 
are very short. While for life-critical application such as control system for 
nuclear power plants, high reliability is the main concern since no failure can be 
tolerated during the life of the system. Reliability and availability are related in 
such a way that improving module reliability will automatically improve its 
availability, but the reverse is not necessary true. 
 
2.2 Software Faults  
A system can be viewed as a set of modules - hardware and software – 
that communicate with each other through network (wired or wireless) to 
achieve common goals. Each module is designed to perform a specified number 
of functions and it has a well defined interface through which it can interact 
with other modules.  A module may also divided into several sub-modules if it 
is large.    
Systems fail due to a variety of problems with their software and hardware. 
Field studies [Gray91] and everyday experience show that the dominant cause 
of failures today is software faults, both in the application and operating system. 
We mean by “application” any software module that runs over the operating 
system ranging from end-user applications to system applications.  
As previously mentioned, software fault is the root cause of error and 
possible consequent failure. It is a defect that is located in a fixed position in a 
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specific module. However, the error that is caused by the software fault may not 
be limited to a single module and it may propagate to other modules. Consider 
the case where the faulty module starts sending corrupted messages to other 
modules, if the receiving modules are not prepared to handle such errors, they 
may fail too.  
The behavior of the fault is critical to the success of any proposed 
recovery method. Recall that recovery can be first started after detection of the 
failure so the evolvement from fault activation to failure detection is important 
to understand in order to ensure a successful recovery procedure after a failure. 
Most of the existing failure recovery techniques have some assumptions to the 
behavior of the software faults that they can tolerate. 
 
2.3 Building fault tolerant systems 
To build a fault tolerant system, there are four key elements to be 
addressed. A lack of any one of these elements will make the system less fault 
tolerant. 
1. Redundancy: A fault tolerant system must not have any single point of 
failure, therefore, both hardware and data redundancy is necessary to 
recover from hardware and software faults. The principle of redundancy 
relies on the fact that the probability of two or more redundant components 
failing at the same time is very low assuming that there is no dependency 
between them.   
2. Modularity: A fault tolerant system should be decomposed into modules 
where each module (software or hardware) is a unit of service with a well 
defined access interface. Besides that modularity is an important design 
approach to break down the complexity of the system, it is also an affective 
approach to hinder error propagation by adding strict error control at every 
access point to each module.  
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3. Failure detection: The main goal of failure detection is to determine when 
the system (most probably) does not operate correctly and to give the start 
signal for recovery/repair procedure. The quality of failure detection can be 
evaluated by two metrics: detection promptness which is directly translated 
to failure detection latency and second detection reliability which is the 
probability that the failure decision is wrong (false alarm). There are 
different failure detection techniques that can be used separately or in 
combination. Examples of failure detection techniques are: watchdog timers 
to detect hanging processes and heartbeat messages to detect crashed 
processes.     
4.   Failure recovery:   A fault tolerant system should be able to resume 
service after a failure and to bring the system state to that it had before 
failure. The aim of failure recovery is to reduce users’ loss of work as well 
as to minimize redo. A fundamental task for failure recovery process is to 
bring consistency to the system after failure. Failure recovery may need to 
utilize any of the above mentioned elements e.g. redundancy to achieve its 
goal. A vast number of failure recovery techniques have been proposed in 
the literature to achieve fault tolerance in the distributed systems. We treat 
some of the most known techniques in the next section.                                                                           
 
2.4 Failure Recovery Techniques 
During the last four decades, different failure recovery techniques and 
approaches have been developed. We describe some of the most known 
recovery methods in the field of fault-tolerance research.  
2.4.1 Rollback recovery 
Rollback recovery regards the system as a collection of application 
processes that communicate through network. The rollback recovery protocols 
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try to achieve fault tolerance by saving the complete process state of the 
application periodically on stable storage during failure-free execution. Upon a 
failure, the failed process rolls back to its latest saved state and then tries to 
recover from there, thereby reducing the amount of lost computation. The main 
goal of any rollback recovery protocol is to bring the system (processes) into a 
consistent state when inconsistencies occur because of a failure. Rollback 
recovery techniques try to achieve transparent recovery by avoiding the need of 
any involvement of the application programmer and just treat the application to 
be recovered as a black box. The Rollback recovery can be classified into two 
groups [Elnozahy96]: checkpoint based and log-based.   
 
Figure 3: Rollback propagation and domino effect 
• Checkpoint based Recovery: checkpoint-based rollback recovery 
relies on checkpoints to achieve fault tolerance. A check point is a 
“snapshot” of the process  state at a certain point of time as maintained 
by the operating system (program counter, data segments, CPU 
registers, stack pointers, etc) . Upon a failure, checkpoint-based rollback 
recovery restores the system state to the most recent consistent set of 
checkpoints. The simplest form of checkpoint based schemes referred to 
as uncoordinated where each process can conveniently take checkpoints 
according to some local criteria, for example to reduce performance 
C1,1 C1,2 C1,3 
C2,1 C2,2 C2,3 
P1 
P2 
P3 
Failure 
C3,1 C3,2 C3,3 
m1 
m2 
m3 
m4 
m5 
m8 
m6 
m7 
15 
overhead, without taking account to the communication messages with 
the rest of the system. Uncoordinated checkpointing is simple to 
implement but it suffers from domino effect [Randell75] which may 
cause loss of work. After failure,  the failed process rolls back to the 
latest saved checkpoint  but this may not be in consistency with the 
latest checkpoint of one of the other processes, so that process is 
obliged to roll back to next older checkpoint. This cascaded rollback 
may continue and eventually may lead to the domino effect, which 
causes all processes of the system to roll back to the beginning of the 
computation, in spite of all the saved checkpoints. Consider the 
example in Figure 3, the system in this case is composed of three 
processes P1, P2 and P2.  Each process takes a checkpoint – represented 
by black bar independently. Suppose process P1 fails and rolls back to 
checkpoint C1,3. The rollback of P1 invalidates the sending of message 
m8 and so P2 must rollback to checkpoint C2,3 to “invalidate” the receipt 
of that message. Consequently, the rollback of P2 will force the rollback 
of P3 to check point C3,3   to invalidate the receipt of message m7. This 
cascaded rollback continues until all processes roll back to their initial 
checkpoints (C1,1, C2,1, C3,1). To avoid domino effect, coordinated 
checkpointing where processes coordinate their checkpoints in order to 
save a consistent global system state [Chandy85] is used. A coordinator 
process takes a checkpoint and broadcasts a request message to all other 
processes, requesting them to take checkpoint. Checkpoint coordination 
can also be achieved by using synchronized clocks where all system 
processes take checkpoints at approximately the same time without 
need to a coordinator process [Cristian91].    
• Log-based checkpointing: Log-based rollback-recovery uses both 
checkpointing and logging to enable processes to replay their execution 
after a failure beyond the latest checkpoint. Log-based checkpointing is 
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useful for the systems that interact frequently with the outside world. 
The systems in the outside world can not be rolled back and thus 
instead of taking expensive checkpoints whenever messages 
received/sent from/to outside world, it is enough to log messages and 
replay them after failure. Log-based recovery relies on the piecewise 
deterministic assumption [Strom and Yemini 1985]. This assumption 
assumes that the rollback-recovery protocol can identify all the 
nondeterministic events (e.g. receiving messages from the outside world 
and asynchronous interrupts) executed by each process, and for each 
such event, logs a determinant that contains all information necessary to 
replay the event should it be necessary during recovery. There are 
different flavors of log-based recovery depending on how the 
determinants are logged to a stable storage, pessimistic and optimistic 
are two best known log-based recovery techniques. Pessimistic log-
based assumes that a failure can occur after any nondeterministic event 
in the computation and therefore the process is blocked after each 
nondeterministic event waiting for its determinant to be logged to a 
stable storage before processing the event. Pessimistic logging 
simplifies the recovery and rolls back to a system consistent state that is 
very close to the pre-failure state, but the cost to pay is a high failure-
free performance overhead. In contrast, Optimistic logging [Storm85] 
assumes that determinants will be logged to stable storage before a 
failure occurs because failures are normally infrequent and thus there is 
no need to interrupt the process on every nondeterministic event. 
Determinants are kept on volatile log that is periodically flushed to 
stable storage. Optimistic log-based recovery achieves low failure-free 
overhead but uses a rather complex recovery scheme. 
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Rollback based Recovery has focused traditionally on recovering long running 
scientific computations [Casanova97], text editors [Lowell00], spreadsheet 
programs and database systems [Campos95]. 
2.4.2 Replication based recovery 
Replication implements roll-forward mechanism where the entity (mainly a 
server application) is replicated to establish a group of replicas and in the event 
of the failure of one entity, the other replicas can take over and continue 
processing requests. There are two best-known replication approaches: 
• Active replication: In active replication [Schneider93] (also known as 
state-machine approach), all server replicas run concurrently and 
execute the same work so they maintain exactly the same consistent 
state. Every server replica processes every client request in the same 
relative order and sends back a reply. Figure 4 illustrates schematically 
the architecture of active replication with three server replicas. Reliable 
multicast protocols may be used to forward client requests to all 
members of the server group. Majority voting technique is used when 
the group consists of more than two members to deliver the correct 
reply to the client.  If the fail-stop property is assumed then in order to 
tolerate k number of faulty replicas , a group of k+1 replicas is enough 
because faulty replicas keep silent and do not send any incorrect replies. 
However, if the Byzantine property is assumed then 2k+1 replicas is 
needed to sort out a possible k incorrect replies from the k faulty 
replicas. Active replication is very effective for hardware faults and 
provides a fast recovery. Active replication can also be used for load 
balancing by equally distributing clients’ requests on all members of  
the server group. 
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Figure 4: Active replication structure 
 
•  Passive replication: In passive replication (also known as primary-
backup) [Budhiraja93], one member of the server group is designated as 
the primary, while all other replicas serve as backups. The primary 
server is the only one that process clients’ requests and send back 
replies. During normal operation, the state of the primary is periodically 
recorded in a log, typically as a sequence of request and reply messages, 
while?? states and updates as checkpoints.   Upon a failure, a backup 
server is promoted to be the new primary server of the group. The state 
of the new primary is restored to the state of the old primary by 
reloading its state from the log, followed by reapplying request 
messages recorded in the log. 
 
The replication techniques have been mainly used in building enterprise 
distributed applications such as databases and transaction processing systems. 
Some of the best known systems that used replication to achieve fault tolerance 
in the enterprise applications are SIFT [Wensley72], ISIS [Birman94], and 
AQUA [Cukier98]. 
   
server 
client 
Request 
Reply 
server 
server 
19 
2.4.3 N-version programming 
N-version programming [Avizienis77] uses design diversity approach 
and it is defined as the independent generation of N  2 functionally equivalent 
programs from the same initial specification. Independent generation of 
programs means that the programming efforts are carried out by N development 
teams that do not interact with respect to the programming process. The initial 
specification is a formal specification in a specification language. The goal of 
the initial specification is to state the functional requirements completely and 
unambiguously, while leaving the choice of implementations to the N 
programming efforts. N-version programming assumes that all programs 
contain faults, but it relies on the fact that the number of hidden faults will be 
small and that they will be in different locations in each of the versions. 
Wherever possible, different algorithms, programming languages and compilers 
are used in each separate effort.  
Figure 5 shows the basic structure of the N-version programming 
scheme. The N programs run concurrently and the results of each version 
compared and voted on to determine the final output. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: N-version programming structure 
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The case where N equals two is a special case since no majority outcome can be 
derived when the individual program results do not agree.  Most fault-tolerant 
software systems utilize N  3, and use a majority vote to resolve inconsistent 
results. Note that N-version programming is not only a recovery technique but it 
also provides failure detection through voting mechanism.   
The N-version programming is mainly utilized in life-critical applications with a 
high risk of life loss for example flight control computers e.g. in Boeing 737-
300 [Williams83] and Airbus 320 [Traverse88]. 
 
2.5 Limitations 
In this section, we explain  the general limitations of these techniques  
and leave the specific ones concerning the mobile environment to the next 
chapter. 
 Rollback depends on two assumptions: 
1- Transient faults: Without assuming that faults are transient, the 
faulty process will certainly fail again at exactly the same place. 
The faulty process will roll back to the latest saved state and then 
continues its execution (exactly the same program instructions 
are repeated) to restore the pre-failure state before it hits the error 
again. Note that the faulty entity may or may not reactivate the 
permanent fault depending on the latest checkpoint time, but it 
will certainly hit the error.  
2- Good checkpoints: Rollback assumes that only good data is 
saved to a stable storage and this implies that the fail-stop 
property must be upheld. In other words, the saved states must 
not contain the error that is caused by the transient fault. 
 
 Replication has also two assumptions 
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1. Transient fault: Replication approach depends on the assumption 
that most of the software faults are transient. If this assumption is 
not applied, then all members of the replica group will fail at the 
same time, for example because of a permanent software bug.       
2. Fail-stop: Most of the replication techniques assume fail-stop 
property, i.e. an entity works correctly or stops functioning 
completely. This assumption can be relaxed at the cost of more 
complex voting algorithm and an increase in the number of 
replicas. 
 
 N-version or the use of diversity has no technical limitation in general, but 
its main limitation is its high cost both with respect to implementation and 
maintenance. There is a big discussion whether it is better to concentrate on 
developing one reliable version rather than less reliable multi-versions. 
 
The two assumptions about the nature of fault fail-stop and transient are 
dated back to the early 1980’s and they can be probably true for some 
relatively simple applications. But, these assumptions will simply not hold 
for modern distributed communication applications. Everyday experience 
with communication applications has shown that many (if not most) of the 
software faults are permanent and they are reproducible, but they require 
rare sequence of events to be activated. This can be explained with the fact 
that it is almost impossible and not realistic to test every path and 
combination in these large and complex applications.  In some work on 
open-source applications (Apache web server and MySQL 
database)[Chandra00b], it has been found that deterministic faults are about 
72-87% of the total number of faults. Another study on database 
management system [Chandra98] has found that 7% of the faults violate the 
fail-stop property.  It should be mentioned, though, that mobile 
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communications applications are far more complex than the applications in 
these studies. 
Note that we have only concentrated on the intrinsic limitations that 
nothing can be done about them. But, there are some other challenging 
problems that are difficult to resolve completely in real-world communication 
environment. For example, it is very difficult for active replication to preserve 
consistency across all replicas in the presence of non-deterministic behavior 
such as caused by operating system-specific calls, process/thread scheduling, 
timers, etc. 
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Chapter 3  
Mobile Data Communication & Failure Recovery 
In the previous chapter, we described the best known existing failure 
recovery techniques. In this chapter, we will investigate the communication 
characteristics of the mobile network infrastructure and analyze their 
implications on the existing failure recovery techniques. But, we look first at the 
overall architecture of mobile communication systems and then introduce 
TETRA packet data network as a concrete case study.   
3.1 Overall architecture of mobile network  
Mobile communications systems refer generally to any 
telecommunications system which enables a wireless communication when 
users are moving within the service area of the system. One of the main goals in 
the development of mobile communications networks is to provide new data 
communication services, such as packet data communication, and especially IP 
(Internet protocol) services. Because of its high efficiency, packet switched data 
services are expected to be the dominant type of communication in all modern 
mobile networks even to provide voice services (Voice over IP).  
The overall architecture of packet switched mobile communications 
system is depicted in Figure 6 . The system can be roughly divided into 2 parts: 
 
1. Mobile Stations (MS): mobile devices used to transmit and receive 
user data wirelessly.  MS is composed of hardware and software, 
which implements a number of communication protocols. MSs can 
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move from one area (cell) to another and is still able to transfer 
data. 
 
 
Figure 6: The overall architecture of the mobile communication system 
 
2. Fixed Network Infrastructure (FNI):  This is a fixed network 
consisting of base stations, routers, gateways, resource 
management, mobility management units, etc. that exist to support 
the operation of the wireless mobile stations.  
The FNI takes the overall coordination and control of the 
communication with the MSs and it uses peer-to-peer based 
protocols to achieve that. 
 
The External network is an IP-based packet data network that contains 
the destination host requested by the mobile user. The External network can be 
the Internet or a customer private network e.g. LAN or X.25.  
Fixed Network  
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The fixed network connects the wireless mobile stations and the External 
network and consequently plays a critical role to the overall availability of the 
system. A failure in the FNI may disrupt the connection to hundreds or even 
thousands of MSs, this can be a very serious situation especially if the system is 
used in mission-critical applications such as in pubic safety, e.g. fire brigades, 
police forces and ambulance services. 
 
A recovery from failure in mobile stations by using checkpointing and 
message logging has been investigated in the literature e.g. 
[Acharya94][Yao99][Pradhan96]. These literatures have been limited to 
simulation and never really studied the mobile communication protocols 
between MS and FNI. We also find it less important from the overall system 
availability point of view to focus on the recovery from failures in MS rather 
than FNI.       
 
3.2 Mobile Communication Characteristics and their implications 
Mobile data communication has several characteristics that must be 
taken into consideration when developing any failure recovery method. What 
these characteristics are and what implications do these characteristics have 
specifically for the failure recovery in mobile infrastructure is to be investigated 
in this section. These characteristics are as following:   
• Peer-to-peer client/server communication: The communication pattern 
between an application in FNI and its peer application on MS is peer-to-
peer; which means that the communication can be initiated by either side 
(MS or FNI). On the contrary, it is the client that always initiates 
communication in client/server model. However, the application in FNI 
provides service to many peer applications on MSs concurrently (one-to-
many relationship) and it is also designed to be responsible for the overall 
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control, therefore the communication follows also client-server 
(master/slave) model at functional level. This mix of two communication 
models adds more complexity to the infrastructure applications. 
Furthermore, there is a coupling (dependency) between the application 
state in FNI and its peers on MSs resulting from use of the stateful 
communication in the design of mobile packet data services. The use of 
stateful protocols is the primary challenge for failure recovery process. 
• Real time communication: Real time issue arises when there are actions 
that must be completed within a specified amount of time otherwise they 
become useless or even harmful after that. In this context, the entity that 
initiates requests should receive replies within a specified period of time 
otherwise timeouts occur.  The real time aspects of mobile communication 
originate from both the end user application and the physical system. For 
example a user application (running in the application layer of OSI model) 
that monitors victims in the field and wirelessly sends information such as 
blood pressure and cardiac activity to the doctors in hospital needs to send 
this information and receive instructions instantly. In addition, real-time 
requirements are also imposed from the physical layer, for example by 
channel access schemes because data have to be transmitted in the 
assigned time slots. 
• High message rate: The number of messages received and sent per unit 
time is high. Any single application in the FNI can easily send or receive 
many thousands of messages per minute. Therefore, any recovery 
technique that uses message logging has to deal with two particular 
problems i.e. overhead and storage. 
• Distributed service architecture: The FNI is distributed over a large 
geographic area to provide mobility. It is normally that several applications 
running on different nodes cooperate together to complete a single service 
for an MS.  This distributed architecture will affect the selection of fault 
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tolerance approach; it will for example favor distributed redundancy such 
as active/standby approach rather than cluster approach e.g. server pool.   
• Scarce radio resources: The limited bandwidth of the air interface 
underlines the need of efficient communication between mobile stations 
and FNI. Therefore any extra communication to be brought by any 
recovery method should be carefully examined.  
 
What these characteristics imply? The two characteristics real-time and 
peer-to-peer communication combined together implies that message logging 
and then replaying them- as done by log-based checkpointing and passive 
replication- by the applications in FNI after failure will not work because the 
peer applications on MSs may change their state (because of timeouts) and 
hence not able to deal with the outcome of these replayed messages.  
What about taking coordinated checkpoints for applications in FNI and 
MSs? In this case when the application in the FNI rolls back after failure then 
all its peers on MSs need also to roll back. It is very difficult to imagine how 
complex the recovery protocol needed to manage this recovery and it will 
certainly exhaust the scarce radio resources.  
The two characteristics real-time combined with high message rate will 
be a killer to any technique using voting mechanism such as N-version and 
active replication because the delay, which is caused by voting, is proportional 
with message rate, and a second problem is that voting of communication 
messages may require knowledge about their contents.  
Finally, the distributed service architecture will strongly limit the use of 
active replication as it requires a significant increase in the number of hardware 
modules to run the various groups of replicas.   
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Table 3-1 summarizes the negative implications caused by the communication 
characteristics in the FNI.  
 
Table 3-1: Negative implications of FNI communication on recovery techniques 
 
3.3 Requirements for failure recovery in mobile infrastructure  
Let us start with some kinds of philosophy learned from experience. It 
is almost impossible to develop a complex application that is free from faults 
but it is possible through testing to reduce the number of faults to a level at 
which the application reliability is acceptable.  No guarantees can be given to 
what errors caused by the remaining faults can do. Furthermore, client users do 
not care if the failure is caused by the server application, operating system or 
hardware error; they just require the service to be restored immediately.  
Based on what we have studied and analyzed until now, we can point 
the following important requirements for failure recovery in mobile 
environment.  
High availability: because of the distributed nature of the fixed network 
infrastructure, it is difficult to imagine a complete failure of the system. But in 
general, a level of five nines 0.99999 availability (i.e. 5 minutes downtime per 
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year) is considered to be quite good for mission critical communication. Since 
the system is composed of many nodes, the availability of a single node should 
be much better than five nines but this also depends on the importance of the 
node i.e. its failure impact on the end users. We estimate a full recovery time in 
the order of seconds to be good for a single node.   
Low overhead without real-time drawbacks: The overhead – extra CPU 
utilization - that is caused by the presence of failure recovery method should be 
low so that application performance is not significantly affected. It is not 
sufficient with low overhead but it is also important that the overhead has no 
negative impact on real-time communication. By using checkpointing 
mechanism, for example, each process in the system is stopped every time a 
checkpoint is taken. Stopping processes causes time delays and consequently 
the application may fail to adhere to real-time constraints.    
No assumptions on faults: The practical use of the recovery method will 
be significantly improved if no assumptions are made about the nature of faults, 
e.g. transient or fail-stop. It is for example a serious limitation in the case of 
active replication that a permanent (deterministic) software fault will take all 
replicated servers down and practically everything is lost.     
Cost effective:  Any proposed failure recovery method should be cost 
effective. Development of software systems for mobile communication 
infrastructure costs tens of millions of dollars. Solutions such as N-version 
programming that triple or even double the development cost have no chance to 
be adopted. 
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Chapter 4  
Modeling Communication Applications  
Although transparent failure recovery, which does not require any 
intervention on the part of the application or the programmer, is very tempting 
but unfortunately it can not give the solution to many real world systems. It is 
rather simplistic to treat all applications requiring fault tolerance as black boxes 
despite the differences in their functionalities, real-time constraints and 
performance requirements.  As a result of using black box approach, it is 
necessary to put assumptions on the faults behavior for example to be transient, 
or even on the behavior of the application itself for example to act 
deterministically, which implies that application avoids using  nondeterministic 
sources such as multithreading and timers.    In contrast, we believe that 
understanding the communication applications behavior is a key factor in the 
success of the recovery techniques and this is the subject of this chapter. 
4.1 OSI model 
The OSI (Open Systems Inter-connection) layered model [ITU94] is the 
dominant model to develop mobile communication standards as well as to 
design and implement communication software systems. The OSI model 
provides a high level for system architecture and behavior.  Figure 7 illustrates 
peer-to-peer communication in the layered OSI model. In a layered architecture, 
each layer comprises protocol entities that perform functions within the layer. 
The entities in the (N)-layer (and all layers below) provide (N)-service to the 
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(N+1) entities, through (N)-Service-Access-Points ((N)-SAP) at the boundary 
between the (N+1)-layer and (N)-layer. A protocol design for the (N)-layer 
defines both the (N)-service and the (N)-protocol. In the generic OSI model, 
peer (N)-protocol-entities virtually communicate by sending and receiving 
Protocol Data Units (PDUs), which consist of a header containing protocol  
 
               Figure 7: Protocol entities interaction in OSI model 
control information and possibly user data. When the (N+1)-layer at the initiator 
needs to send a PDU to its peer, it sends it with a primitive Request to the lower 
(N)-layer.  The (N)-layer at the responder sends a primitive Indication to deliver 
the PDU to the (N+1)- layer. The peer responds to the indication by sending a 
Response primitive to the lower layer. The lower (N)-layer at the initiator 
notifies the (N+1)-layer about the PDU delivery by sending a primitive 
Confirm. Therefore, the logical path for exchanging information is vertical, via 
SAPs. When a PDU passes a SAP, it becomes an SDU (Service Data Unit) at 
the receiving layer. 
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In peer-to-peer communication, the same protocol entity may become an 
initiator in one case and a responder in another. However, the functions that the 
protocol entity should have depend on whether it acts as service requester 
(initiator) or service provider (responder). The client/server model may also 
included under the OSI model, in the sense that an entity can be designed to 
provide services to a group of peer entities (one-to-many relationship) as it the 
case in mobile communication protocols.  
In the context of OSI model and fault tolerance, Kenneth P. Birman [Birman96] 
has raised a very important question that, to the best of our knowledge, has been 
left without answer until now. Can “well structured” distributed computing 
systems be built that can tolerate the failures of their own components? In 
layering like the OSI one, this issue is not really addressed. The question is 
among the most important ones that will need to be resolved if we want to claim 
that we have arrived at a workable methodology for engineering reliable 
distributed computing systems.  
In this dissertation, we claim that the OSI model is fault tolerance “friendly” 
and it provides a good overall framework to develop failure recovery method 
on.    
The modular architecture of the OSI model fits well with the modularity key 
principle of fault tolerance, in the sense that protocol layer entities can be 
isolated from each other and the only interaction between them is through 
message passing. It is true that entities can still send corrupted messages to each 
other and thus open for error propagation but on the other hand it is quite 
possible for the entities to guard against this problem.     
4.2 Modeling communication protocols by CEFSM 
The OSI model, as mentioned in the previous section, provides an overall model 
for the distributed system behavior by defining the interaction mechanism 
between adjacent layers through SAPs and between peer layers by PDUs. In our 
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work to develop an effective failure recovery method for the FNI, we are further 
interested in a model that can describe in a sufficient degree the functional 
requirements of each protocol entity. The Communicating Extended Finite State 
Machine (CEFSM) is selected to formally describe the behavior of 
communication protocols entities. The CEFSM is used in a number of 
industrially significant specification techniques, such as SDL [ITU96] and 
UML [OMG02]. Our definition of CEFSM is different from that of [Byun02] in 
the sense that it is adapted to the OSI model to give it the ability to well model 
the complexity of the standard communication protocols.  
Definition: A CEFSM is a 6-tuple (S, I, E, A, O, T) where 
• S is a finite nonempty set of states, where one of these is initial state. 
• I is a set of information elements with their types and initial values. The 
information elements are used by entities for coordination and control. 
Each information element i (i ∈ I)  may have any number of bytes/bits 
and  is shared by more than one  entity (peer or adjacent). Examples of 
information elements are fields in the PDU header (e.g. sequence 
numbers), primitive parameters (e.g. request number) and constants 
defined by the protocol (e.g. maximum number of retransmissions and 
timer values).   
• E is a finite nonempty set of input events.   An input event e (e ∈ E) is 
one of the following three types: 
i. Receipt of an indication or confirm primitive from the next 
lower layer. 
ii. Receipt of a request or a response primitive from the next 
higher layer. 
iii. Receipt of an input signal that is triggered by, for example, 
timer expiration. 
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• A is a set of actions. This set may include various activities e.g. 
updating variables, incrementing/ decrementing counters, 
starting/stopping timers, queuing management, etc.  An action a (a ∈ A) 
may update some information elements and/or it may also require input 
information elements for its execution, this is denoted as a(i). 
• O is a set of outputs. An output event o (o ∈ O) is one of following two 
types. 
i. Sending a request or a response primitive to the next lower 
layer. 
ii. Sending an indication or confirm primitive to the next higher 
layer 
• T is a set of state transitions  
                     (t: (scurrent , e(Ψ) )([a],[o], snext) 
Where t is a mapping from each state-event pair (scurrent ,e)  to a 
corresponding action set, output  set and next state snext. The event e is 
associated with an optional predicate Ψ which is a condition that decides 
the selection of the next state.  The predicate Ψ  has the following form: i ~ 
c  , where   ~ ∈{<, >, ==, ≠} and c ∈    
The action and output sets contain zero or more elements, in other words 
the state-event pair may or may not trigger any action or send output. Note 
that CEFSM is deterministic because the selection criterion to make the 
transition for each state-event is clearly defined. 
It is in place to give a more clear definition of some terms. We use the term 
entity to mean a layer or a software process/thread that is actually an 
implementation of the functions that are defined for a given layer. The 
functionality provided by a layer is formally expressed by its set of 
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transition T. The term state information includes both the set of states S and 
the set of information I of the entity. Finally, an application includes one or 
more entities. 
 
4.3 Case Study: TETRA Packet Data  
TETRA packet data protocol [ETSI03] is developed by European 
Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI) to provide wireless data service 
that satisfy the most demanding mobile radio users, particularly users working 
in public safety, e.g. police, fire brigade and ambulance service. TETRA packet 
data protocol has many similarities with the General Packet Radio Service 
(GPRS) that has been built on GSM to provide IP packet data services. We use 
TETRA packet data as a concrete case study to firstly apply the CEFSM model 
and secondly to use it later to build an experimental testbed for evaluation of 
our proposed recovery method. The selection of TETRA packet data does not 
restrict the applicability of the proposed method to TETRA; it may be well used 
on other protocols for example GPRS or UMTS (Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System). 
TETRA packet data is built on top of the basic TETRA radio link protocol stack 
and provides service mechanisms to convey different higher layer protocols. 
The network layer protocols supported by the TETRA packet data include 
Internet Protocol (IP) versions 4 and 6. Thus the TETRA packet data extends 
the TETRA network to act as an IP subnet in the mobile IP scheme, which 
enables application programmers to build their applications in a well 
standardized environment. Figure 8 illustrates the protocol stacks of the TETRA 
packet data when an application using the IP protocol is located in a mobile 
station MS. The fixed network infrastructure (also referred to as Switching and 
Management Infrastructure in TETRA terminology) communicates over an air 
interface R0 with a TETRA mobile station.  
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Figure 8: TETRA Packet Data Protocol stack 
The TETRA packet data protocol stack provides the specifications for a number 
of protocols that cover the physical layer, the data link layer, and the network 
layer of the OSI model.    
We briefly describe the TETRA Packet Data Protocol stack, starting from the 
highest layer of the stack and working our way downward.   
• SubNetwork Dependent Convergence Protocol (SNDCP): This stateful 
protocol is used to negotiate and maintain PDP (Packet Data Protocol) 
context between MS and FNI. Before any user IP packets can be conveyed 
by the SNDCP layer, it is necessary for the MS to successfully negotiate a 
PDP context with the infrastructure in order to gain access to SNDCP 
services. PDP context activation involves the negotiation of a PDP address 
(e.g. an IPv4 address) and other parameters (e.g. timers’ values) to be used 
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during data transfer. Furthermore, control of PDP data transfer, packet data 
channel handling and data compression is also performed in this layer. The 
SNDCP provides services to its user at SN (Symbol Number) SAP.   
• Mobile Link Entity (MLE): This layer is used to manage mobility and radio 
resources for the higher SNDCP layer. The MLE layer performs 
surveillance of the quality of the radio communication path based on 
information received from the MAC layer. MLE shall also report any loss 
or break of the path, for example due to cell change. The MLE entity 
provides services to SNDCP via LTPD (Link Entity TETRA product Data) 
SAP. 
• Logical Link Control (LLC): The LLC layer provides two types of logical 
links, basic link for connectionless services and advanced link for 
connection-oriented services. Basic link is used for short messages like 
signaling messages, while advanced link is used for long messages data 
transfer that requires some type of QoS. This layer offers segmentation of 
long messages, retransmission, and error control using frame check 
sequence.  LLC entity provides services to MLE at TLA (Type Identifier on 
Accept) SAP. 
• Medium Access Control (MAC): This layer is responsible for channel 
access, MAC uses TDMA (Time Division Multiple Access) access scheme 
with four physical channels (timeslots) per carrier. MS-MAC layer uses 
random access based on slotted ALOHA procedures to initiate transaction 
and reserved access for further processing in order to achieve higher 
channel throughput. MAC layer performs other functions such as channel 
coding, forward error correction, measurement of the signal quality and 
encryption over the air interface.  The MAC services are accessed at the 
TMA (Transmit Multiple Access) SAP. 
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• Air Interface (AI): This is the physical layer, which is responsible for 
modulation/ demodulation, frame synchronization and power control. The 
services of the AI are accessed at TP (Traffic Physical channel) SAP. 
 
4.3.1 CEFSM model for SNDCP protocol 
We select the FNI SNDCP protocol entity in FNI to demonstrate how a CEFSM 
model can be developed.  The SNDCP protocol is used by different mobile 
communication standards e.g. GPRS. The SNDCP protocol services, however, 
should exist in every mobile communications system that provide wireless data 
services. 
We give first a description of the SNDCP protocol in accordance with the 
standard. SNDCP protocol maps a network-level protocol, such as IP, to the 
underlying wireless protocols. SNDCP also controls packet data transfer 
between the MS and FNI. An MS can be in Idle, Standby or Ready state 
depending on its current activity. In the Idle state, MS is not reachable; no data 
transfer to and from the FNI is possible. In order to transfer data, the MS shall 
perform a PDP context activation procedure with its peer in the infrastructure. 
After completing a successful PDP context activation, the MS enters Standby 
state. A Standby timer associated with Standby state to control the time an MS 
retains SNDCP services after data service inactivity. The purpose of the 
Standby timer is to work as a fallback timer to delete PDP contexts when they 
remain unintentionally undeleted and thus having better resource utilization. 
The Standby timer is in the range of hours and is started on entry to Standby 
state. In the Ready state the MS may receive and transmit data. MS enters 
Ready state when it is granted a data channel. A Ready Timer associated with 
Ready state to control the time an MS may remain inactive on data channel after 
data service activity. The Ready timer is in the range of seconds and is started 
on entry to Ready state.   Table 4-1 shows our CEFSM model for the SNDCP  
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S = {s1, s2, s3} { Idle, Standby, Ready} 
I = {i1, i2, 
       i3, i4 , 
       i5,i6} 
{create_context_response_status, ip_addr,  
data_transmit_response_status ,  ms_location,  
standby_timer_value, ready_timer_value} 
E = {e1,  
         e2, 
         e3 , 
        e4, 
        e5, e6, 
        e7, e8, 
        e9, e10} 
{ACTIVATE_PDP_CONTEXT_DEMAND PDU in ind., 
 Create_PDP_Context response,  
DEACTIVATE_PDP_CONTEXT_DEMAND PDU in ind,  
DATA_TRANSMIT_REQUEST PDU in Ind., 
 DATA PDU in Ind , Data_Packet request , 
 Transmission_Report indication, RECONNECT PDU in Ind ,  
Standby_timer_expire, Ready_timer_expire} 
A = {a1, a2, a3,  
       a4, a5, a6, e7} 
{ Set_value, Cretate_ms_record, , Delete_ms_record, 
  Stop_timer, Start_timer, enqueue_packet, dequeue_packet } 
O = {o1, o2,  
       o3 ,  
       o4, 
      o5,   
      o6, 
      o7, 
      o8, o9, 
     o10, 
     o11 , 
     o12, o13} 
{Create_PDP_Context request,  Delete_PDP_Context request, 
ACTIVATE_PDP_CONTEXT_ACCEPT PDU in Resp., 
ACTIVATE_PDP_CONTEXT_REJECT PDU in Resp., 
DEACTIVATE_PDP_CONTEXT_ACCEPT PDU in Resp, 
DEACTIVATE_PDP_CONTEXT_DEMAND PDU in Req,  
DATA_TRANSMIT_RESPONSE PDU in Resp, 
Data_Packet indication ,DATA PDU in Req,  
DATA_TRANSMIT_REQUEST PDU in Req,  
Packet_Delivery_Status indication, 
PAGE_REQUEST PDU in Req,  END_OF_DATA PDU in Req}
 
T= {t1, 
        t2, 
         t3, 
         t4, 
        t5, 
        t6, 
        t7, 
         t8, 
{ ( s1 , e1  ) ( [o1], s1)  
  ( s1 , e2(i1  == “Accepted” ) ) ([ a2,a1(i2), a5(i5)], [ o3], s2) 
   ( s1 , e2(i1  == “Rejected” ) ) ( [o4], s1) 
   ( s2 , e3 ) ([ a4(i5), [o2, o5] ], s1) 
   ( s2 , e10 ) ([a3], [o2, o6] s1) 
   ( s2 , e4 ) ([a2(i3), a4(i5), a5(i6)], [o7],s3) 
   ( s2 , e6(i4   “Known” )  )([ a6], [o12], s2 ) 
   ( s2 , e6(i4  == “Known” )  )([ a6], [o10], s2 ) 
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         t9, 
         t10, 
        t11, 
         t12,  
      t13 , 
     t14 } 
   ( s2 , e7)( [ a7,a5(i6)], [ o9], s3 ) 
   ( s3 , e7 )( [a4(i6),a5(i6)], [o11], s3 ) 
   ( s3 , e6)( [ o9], s3 ) 
   ( s3 , e8) ([a1(i4), a4(i6), a5(i5)], s2) 
     
( s3 , e5 ) ([ a4(i6),a5(i6)], [o8], s3) 
   ( s3 , e10 ) ([a5(i5)], [o13], s2) } 
 
Table 4-1: CEFSM model for the SNDCP entity in FNI 
protocol entity in FNI. The formats of the PDUs exchanged by SNDCP peer 
entities are listed in Appendix A. CEFSM is usually represented graphically by 
a state transition diagram (STD), a directed graph whose vertices correspond to 
states and whose edges correspond to transitions. Figure 9 shows the STD of the 
FNI SNDCP protocol entity. Each state is represented by a circle, and the initial 
state has a double circle. Transition that does not lead to a new state is 
represented by an arc that points to itself. 
 
      Figure 9: STD of SNDCP entity in FNI 
 
A description of the SNDCP state transitions is given below:
 
t1: On reception of an ACTIVATE_PDP_CONTEXT_DEMAND PDU [Table 
A-1] in an indication primitive (event e1) from the lower layer MLE at state 
t10,t11,t13 t7,t8 
 
t4, t5 
t1, t3 
t2 
 S1 
t14 
t6,t9 
 S2  S3 
Ready Standby 
 Idle 
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Idle, the SNDCP entity in FNI sends  Create_PDP_Context request  to the upper 
layer (output o1). 
t2 :   Upon receiving Create_PDP_Context response from the upper layer (e2) 
with response status set to “Accepted”  (i1  == “Accepted”) to indicate that PDP 
context is created successfully, create MS record (action a2), set the MS IP 
address to the received value a1(i2), send ACTIVATE_PDP 
_CONTEXT_ACCEPT PDU[Table A-2] in a response to MLE (o3) , start 
Standby timer a5(i5)  and finally enter the Standby state 
t3 : Upon receiving Create_PDP_Context response  from the upper layer (e2) 
with response status “Rejected” (i1  == “Rejected”)  to indicate that PDP context 
is not created then send ACTIVATE_PDP_CONTEXT_REJECT PDU[Table 
A-3] in a response to MLE (o4). 
t4: On reception of a DEACTIVATE_PDP_CONTEXT_DEMAND PDU 
[Table A-7] in an indication primitive (e3) from MLE layer at Standby, send  
DEACTIVATE_PDP_CONTEXT _ACCEPT PDU [Table A-8] in a response to 
MLE (o5) , send Delete_PDP_Context request to the upper layer (o2), delete MS 
record a3, stop Standby timer a4(i5)   and finally enter the Idle state. 
t5 : Upon expiry of Standby timer (e9), send  DEACTIVATE_PDP_CONTEXT 
_DEMAND PDU in a request to MLE (o6) , send Delete_PDP_Context request 
to the upper layer(o2), delete MS record a3  and  enter the Idle state. 
t6 : On reception of a  DATA_TRANSMIT_REQUEST  PDU[Table A-5]  in an  
indication from MLE (e4), send DATA_TRANSMIT_RESPONSE PDU[Table 
A-6] (with Accept) in a response to MLE (o7),  stop Standby timer  a4(i5) , start 
Ready timer a5(i6) and finally enter the Ready state. 
t7 :  Upon receiving  Data_Packet  request containing IP data packet from the 
upper layer at Standby state (e6) and MS location is not known (i4   “Known” ) , 
queue the IP packet a6, send PAGE_REQUEST PDU[Table A-9] in a request to 
MLE (o12). 
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t8 :  Upon receiving  Data_Packet  request from the upper layer at Standby state 
(e6) and MS location is known (i4  == “Known” ) , queue the IP packet a6, send 
DATA_TRANSMIT_REQUEST PDU in a request to MLE (o10). 
t9 : Upon receiving Transmission_Report indication from the MLE (e7) at 
Standby state, remove the IP packet/s from the queue a7, encapsulate Packet/s in 
DATA PDU/s[Table A-4] and send as request primitive to MLE (o9), start 
Ready timer and enter Ready state.  
t10 : Upon receiving Transmission_Report indication from the MLE (e7) at 
Ready state, send Packet_Delivery_Status indication containing transfer status 
to the higher layer (o11), and restart (stop and then start) Ready timer.  
t11 :  Upon receiving  Data_Packet request containing IP data packet (e6) from 
the higher layer at Ready state, place the IP packet in a DATA PDU and send 
the PDU  in a request primitive to MLE (o9). 
t12 : Upon reception of a RECONNECT PDU[Table A-10] in an indication from 
MLE (e8) - indicating that MS changed cell-, update the new location a1(i4), stop 
Ready timer a4(i6), start Standby timer a5(i5)  and  enter the Standby state. 
t13 : On reception of a DATA  PDU  -containing IP packet data- in an indication  
from the lower layer MLE (e5), restart Ready timer and  send  Data_Packet 
indication to the upper layer (o8). 
t14 : Upon Ready timer expiration (e10), send End_Of_Data PDU[Table A-11] in 
a request to MLE (o13), start Standby timer a5(i5) and then enter the Standby 
state. 
As it can be noticed, by using our OSI-adapted CEFSM, communication 
protocols can be modeled with a high level of detail to include any of the 
specifications in the standard. That also means that the CEFSM model describes 
the behavior of the protocol entity very realistically.  Finally, a CEFSM model 
for the SNDCP entity at MS can also be developed in the same way according 
to the standard specifications.  The MS SNDCP entity, however, has some extra 
states e.g. to handle cell change situation. 
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Chapter 5  
State Transition Based Recovery (STBR) 
Armed with the CEFSM model, we are ready to attack our main goal to 
develop a recovery technique that can improve the service availability in the 
mobile infrastructure. The proposed technique should be realistic enough to deal 
with real world programming faults, relatively easy to understand and 
implement, and cost effective. We call our recovery method state transition 
based recovery (STBR) because it is based on CEFSM model which in turn is 
based on the traditional state transition model.  
5.1 Objective & assumptions 
STBR failure recovery method should be able to tolerate software and 
hardware faults without any assumption on the nature of faults. The method 
should work in the mobile environment and has no negative impact on the real-
time communication. The faulty entity in the FNI has to resume communication 
after a failure in a way that hides the failure from all its peer entities on MSs. In 
other words, the peers should always receive input events in accordance with 
their protocol specifications.  
Although there are no assumptions on the nature of faults e.g. to be 
transient or fail-stop, there are two prerequisites that need to be satisfied in 
order for the STBR method to deliver the promised high availability: 
I. Error detection mechanism: We assume that there are mechanisms to 
quickly detect the failure and either to restart the faulty entity on the 
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active node or to immediately run it on a redundant node. Fault 
detection is an important part of building fault tolerant systems, but it 
is beyond the scope of this work. There are two main approaches to 
perform fault detection. Firstly, by monitoring locally the application 
for example by letting the entity kicks a watchdog timer as long as it 
is running to indicate that it is still in operating state [Mahmood88]. 
Secondly, by remotely sending periodic heartbeats and expecting 
responses from that entity [Han99]. These techniques can detect 
failures caused by hardware faults or coding faults which cause the 
application to crash or hang. But design faults - where the application 
works correctly from software point of view but fails to provide 
correct service according to the specifications – are rather difficult to 
detect. 
II. Software reliability: The software applications to be recovered need 
to be reasonably reliable before becoming high available, an 
application that fails once every day on average is not reliable 
enough. In other words, it is desirable that the activation rate of the 
remaining software faults which can lead to failures is relatively low. 
What that means in practice? It means that these remaining faults are 
activated, for example, by rare scenarios that are not tested or slow 
memory leak.  Software reliability can be achieved by a good test 
plan that includes different types of tests e.g. unit test, integration test, 
system test, etc. Testing complex software systems such as mobile 
communication is extremely difficult and time consuming due to the 
large number of scenario and test cases to be considered. The 
hardware reliability is not considered because it is very high 
nowadays. 
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5.2 STBR Approach 
A well designed protocol should always consider the disturbances that 
may occur in the communication environment between clients and servers or 
more generally between sender and receiver such as time delays , data loss, 
duplication and out of order. These disturbances in the communication path are 
coped with by the protocols, mainly as exceptional cases that shall be handled 
by both sender and receiver. Our intention is to utilize that for the recovery of 
the entities in FNI in such a way that a failure is experienced as a disturbance by 
the client entities on MSs. Thus the basic idea is to handle the failure as a 
disturbance that the application should recover from by itself.  
 
In the STBR approach, we seek to conform both to the key principles of 
building fault tolerant system and to the specific requirements of mobile 
environment. The STBR method applies the following set of principles to reach 
the objective: 
• Restarting faulty entity: Restarting the faulty entity as a first step of recovery 
process is a secure way to ensure that the entity is free from the error that 
caused its failure. All existing techniques that try to get the latest saved state, 
and then reach the same internal state as if fault has not occurred, have no 
guarantee that the error is cleared from the saved states. Consequently, there is 
a probability that the entity fails again short after its recovery. In case of 
permanent software fault there is still a risk that the entity using STBR do fail 
again after restart, but the probability is very low because the rare situation 
which activated the fault that lead to the failure has to re-occur. Why this 
should not be also true for rollback techniques and passive replication? These 
techniques intentionally seek to repeat the exact “faulty” pre-failure execution 
during their recovery while STBR starts the execution from the beginning and 
focus on service recovery. Restarting from the beginning is a secure remedy 
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against transient faults and the best solution against permanent faults, 
however, it needs to be followed by a fast recovery.    
• Model-based recovery: The STBR recovery is based on the behavior of the 
application represented by the CEFSM model. We will use our case study 
from previous chapter to explain this.  Assume that the SNDCP entity in FNI 
crashed while servicing its peer clients on MSs and then get restarted. 
Normally, the FNI SNDCP entity will start operating from the initial state 
(S1), so if the SNDCP entity should function correctly then all peer clients  
 
Figure 10: STD of FNI SNDCP entity extended with Recovery State   
that are not at initial should go back to initial state. Thus, without any recovery 
method clients not at initial state need to return to initial state and then redo 
some work to reach their pre-failure state. How can STBR fix this situation?          
According to the CEFSM model, if the protocol entity processes the set 
of events E in compliance with the specified set of transitions T, then it behaves 
correctly. Figure 9 shows actually how this is achieved for an FNI SNDCP 
entity that does not fail. Figure 10, on the other hand, is extended with Recovery 
state (S0) to include failure situation. After a failure, the FNI SNDCP entity 
restarts as usual and assumes by default that all its peer entities at initial state 
(S1). The FNI SNDCP entity becomes inconsistent once it receives an input 
event related to a peer that is not at initial state. To solve inconsistency, the 
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 S1 S2 S3 
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Recovery 
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entity enters Recovery state( shown as dashed circle), finds out what is the 
current correct state of that peer, returns to the consistent state (any state other 
than initial) and finally executes the corresponding state transition. The 
Recovery state is entered from Initial state only once and only for the MS 
entities that need recovery. The FNI entity needs also to be aware about its 
failure in the previous execution before moving to Recovery state. We explain 
later in this chapter in details the recovery mechanism.      
To achieve the above mentioned recovery steps, the FNI SNDCP entity 
should know at any time the current state scurrent and information elements I of 
every peer entity. Therefore, the FNI SNDCP entity needs to save state 
information of every peer entity during failure-free execution and to use them 
after failure in order to process all input events correctly. In the next section a 
recovery protocol is developed to save/retrieve state information to/from a 
stable storage. 
• Autonomous recovery:   The faulty entity should be able to autonomously do 
self-recovery without involvement from either peer or adjacent entities. This 
principle will ensure that no modification is needed for MSs. Furthermore, the 
restart of a faulty entity does not require the restart of any other entity. 
Finally, it will not be necessary that all entities in system need to be built with 
the STBR.      
• Active/standby redundant system: Active/standby redundancy is an effective 
technique to prevent single point of failure in a distributed system. In case of a 
hardware fault, the faulty entity should be able to immediately start on the 
redundant standby node and resume the service to its peer entities on MSs. 
This ability can also be used for software faults in the operating system to 
avoid delay caused by reboot process. Active/standby approach is cost 
effective because the standby node can be used as a backup for more than a 
single node (N+1 redundancy) assuming that all active nodes running the 
same operating system. 
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5.3 Recovery protocol 
To enable the FNI entities to easily save/retrieve their state information, 
we have developed a protocol that uses the client server architecture, see          
Figure 11. Every entity in FNI that uses STBR method sends states S and 
information elements I during failure-free execution to a server task referred to 
as State Information Saver (SIS) for storing, and then continues its execution 
(non-blocked mode). The SIS runs on a separate hardware waiting for requests 
in a blocked mode, requests that need responses will always be processed before 
any others in order to minimize response time. The SIS adds timestamp and 
saves the information on a stable storage e.g. non-volatile RAM or hard disk. 
The entity should first register itself to the SIS before it can start saving state 
information.  The client side of the protocol (FNI) is implemented as a user 
level library of C functions that can be linked with the FNI entities. Some of the 
user functions provided by the library are listed below: 
 
 
         Figure 11: Recovery protocol using client/server model 
 
• Entity_Register (entity_id): This function sends a request message of type 
REGISTER (refer to) to the SIS to register the entity identified by entity_id. 
Every entity must call this function once it starts up.  The entity will receive a 
response message from SIS with one of the following response code “Ok”, 
“Not_ok” or “Aleardy-registered”, the latter response code indicates that the 
entity has not exited normally from last run (possible crash).  
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• Entity_Deregister (entity_id): This call sends a request message of type 
DEREGISTER to the SIS to deregister the entity identified by entity_id field. 
This call must always be executed before the entity exits. Failing to do 
deregistration will result in receiving “Already_registered” response status in 
 Figure 12: Format of requests and responses used in recovery protocol 
 
the next registration. The entity will receive a response message of type     
DEREGISTER from SIS task to acknowledge deregistration.   
• Save_Info_Element (entity_id, object_id, elem_id, elem_length, 
elem_value): This call sends a request message of type SAVE   to save or 
update state information element that is identified by elem_id and of  length 
elem_length in bytes. The elem_value contains the raw data information. The 
object_id specifies the object that the information element belongs to, for 
example object_id could specify the MS identification number.  
• Retrieve_Info_Element (entity_id, object_id, elem_id): This call sends a 
request message of type RETRIEVE to retrieve information element for entity 
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with id number entity_id. The information element has id number elem_id and 
belongs to MS identified by object_id. A response message is received from 
SIS contains object_id, elem_id, elem_age, elem_length and elem_value 
fields. elem_value contains the requested information element and elem_age 
is the time elapsed since last save. The information element age is useful for 
the information that is time dependent. 
 
The advantages of using client-server model in the recovery method are 
following: 
I. The failure-free overhead caused by STBR recovery method will be low 
because entities need only to send requests while the SIS task executes save 
function and search algorithm.  
II. The entity will not be suspended during failure-free execution as it is the case 
in checkpointing mechanism and thus no negative impact on time-critical 
communication.   
III. Good scalability, as the system gets larger i.e. number of entities in FNI is 
increased, it should be easy to add more SIS tasks to serve them. 
 
5.4 Mechanism 
The mechanism of the STBR method will be illustrated for FNI SNDCP entity 
by using MSC (Message Sequence Charts) [ITU-T recommendation Z.120]. 
MSC is one of the most popular languages used in telecommunication to show 
interaction between protocol entities. MSC diagrams describe the behavior of 
the system in the form of message flows. We will explain how the recovery 
scheme acts during failure-free execution e.g. during PDP context activation 
and data transfer scenarios, and how recovery is executed after failure. The 
reader should refer to the SNDCP developed CEFM model [section 4.3.1] in 
order to completely understand these scenarios. 
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5.4.1 STBR during failure-free execution 
Every FNI entity that uses STBR method must call Entity_Register 
once it starts to register itself to SIS. After receiving an “OK” response, the 
entity saves it state information during its execution as illustrated in the 
following scenarios for SNDCP entity.  
 
Figure 13: MSC showing STBR during successful PDP context activation  
 The MSC diagram in Figure 13 shows how STBR acts during a 
successful PDP context activation. Dashed arrows are used to show the 
communication with the SIS, while solid arrows show the communication with 
adjacent layers, and the flow of time occurs downward. The SNDCP entity in 
FNI and all peer entities on MSs will begin at initial state IDLE. When MS 
needs to start wireless data services, the MS SNDCP sends an 
ACTIVATE_PDP_CONTEXT_DEMAND PDU to FNI SNDCP. The FNI 
SNDCP receives ACTIVATE_PDP_CONTEXT_DEMAND PDU in an 
indication primitive from the lower layer MLE (input event e1), so it executes 
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transition t1 where Create_PDP_Context request is sent to the upper layer 
(output o1). Upon receiving Create_PDP_Context reponse  (e2) indicating that 
PDP context is created, transition t2 is executed where 
ACTIVATE_PDP_CONTEXT _ACCEPT PDU is sent in a response primitive 
to MLE (o2), Standby state is entered , Standby timer is started and finally 
Save_Info_Element_Req is sent to save the new state and other information 
elements such as received IP address and timer values (i2, i5, i6) . When MS 
SNDCP receives ACTIVATE_PDP_CONTEXT_ACCEPT PDU, it enters 
STANDBY state and starts Standby timer. 
 
Figure 14 MSC showing STBR during uplink data transfer 
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Figure 14 shows how the STBR acts during uplink data transfer (from 
MS to FNI). In this scenario the MS is at Standby state and has user data to 
send, so MS SNDCP entity sends DATA_TRANSMIT_REQ PDU to FNI. 
When the FNI SNDCP receives DATA_TRANSMIT_REQ PDU in an 
indication (e4), it executes transition t6 where DATA_TRANSMIT_RESPONSE 
PDU (with Accept) is sent in a response to MLE (o7),  Standby timer is stopped 
a4(i5), Ready timer is started a5(i6), Ready state is entered and finally  
Save_Info_Element is called to save the new state. The MS SNDCP receives 
DATA_TRANSMIT_RESPONSE PDU with a granted data channel and begins 
transmitting the first IP packet in a DATA PDU. The FNI SNDCP receives 
DATA PDU and executes transition t13 where it forwards the IP packet in 
Data_Packet indication to the higher layer (o5), restart the Ready timer, and 
finally call Save_Info_Element to update the Ready state. Although transition 
t13 re-enters the same state (Ready), however, calling Save_Info_Element will 
make it possible after failure to resynchronize with the peer by calculating the 
time passed since state was last re-entered (elem_age is used). This is useful 
when the state is associated with a timer. MS SNDCP continues to send DATA 
PDUs to the FNI SNDCP entity until no more data remains. When FNI SNDCP 
Ready timer expires (e10), transition t14 is executed where END_OF_DATA 
PDU is sent in a request to MLE (o13), Standby state is entered, Standby timer is 
started and finally Save_Info_Element is called to save the new state. 
Figure 15 shows how the STBR acts during downlink data transfer 
(from FNI to MS). In this scenario FNI has data (e.g. originating from another 
MS or dispatcher center) to send to an MS that is at Standby and whose location 
is known. On the reception of the first packet in Data_Packet request from the 
upper layer (e6) the FNI SNDCP entity executes state transition t7 where it 
queues the packet and then sends DATA_TRANSMIT_REQUSET PDU in 
request primitive to MLE entity. When the PDU is completely transmitted on 
the air, the FNI SNDCP receives Transmission_Report indication (e7) and 
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executes state transition t9 where the queued packet is placed in DATA PDU 
and sent in a request to MLE (o9), Ready state is entered, Ready timer is started 
and finally Save_Info_Element is called to save the new state. After  
 
Figure 15 MSC showing STBR during downlink data transfer 
transmitting the DATA PDU on the air the FNI SNDCP receives 
Transmission_Report indication and executes state transition t10 where 
Packet_Delivery_Status indication is sent to inform the upper layer about the 
transfer of the packet, Ready timer is restarted  and finally Save_Info_Element 
is called to update the state. The upper layer continues to send the remaining 
packets in Data_Packet requests to the FNI SNDCP entity in the same manner. 
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Let us for a moment compare state information saving by STBR with 
state saving by checkpointing mechanism. In recovery techniques that use 
checkpointing there are two factors to struggle with during failure-free 
execution, and they need to be considered carefully. The two factors are the 
comprehensiveness of the process state being saved and the frequency at which 
the process state to be saved. In other words, how much process information 
should the checkpoints include to fully describe the state of the application and 
how often checkpoints to be taken. In deciding the degree of comprehensiveness 
and frequency to be used, there is a tradeoff between the amount of lost work 
and the performance overhead. This is not an easy task to solve without 
knowledge about the application to be recovered, therefore most checkpoint-
based recovery schemes let the application programmer determines when to 
take checkpoints. However, in STBR as we can see from the scenarios these are 
nicely determined by the STBR mechanism. The STBR saves only the 
necessary state information and at the right time.   
5.4.2 STBR during failure recovery 
Once the faulty FNI entity restarts after failure, it calls Entity_Register 
as usual, but it receives “Already_registered” response this time from SIS 
because it did not call Entity_Deregister as a result of failure. That response can 
be used to make the entity aware of its previous failure.  The entity can also get 
automatically informed about its previous failure by error detection utilities. In 
this section different SNDCP scenarios are used to show how the STBR 
performs recovery after failure. 
 Figure 16 shows an MSC diagram of recovery procedure for an MS 
initiated communication. The MS was at Standby state when the FNI SNDCP 
entity crashed. In this scenario the MS needs to send data, so MS SNDCP entity 
sends DATA_TRANSMIT_REQ PDU to FNI. The FNI SNDCP entity receives 
DATA_TRANSMIT_REQ PDU in an indication (e4) at initial state Idle, but 
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since the state-event pair (e4, s1) is inconsistent with T (i.e. does not belong to 
the set of state transitions T) and in addition to its knowledge of the previous 
failure, FNI SNDCP enters Recovery state and calls Retrieve_Info_Element to  
 
Figure 16: Recovery of an MS initiated communication (Standby) 
 
retrieve the saved state and information elements (i3, i5, i6) from SIS for the MS 
in concern. Based on the retrieved information, the FNI SNDCP enters Standby 
state and starts Standby timer with the calculated value (i5 - elem_age of 
Standby state) to achieve synchronization with the running Standby timer in MS 
SNDCP. The FNI SNDCP will execute the state transition t6, where 
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DATA_TRANSMIT_RESPONSE PDU, starts Ready timer and enters Ready 
state. The consistency is now fully restored between the FNI SNDCP and MS 
SNDCP and the communication between them can continue as normal. 
 
Figure 17: Recovery of an MS initiated communication (Ready) 
Figure 17 shows MSC diagram of recovery procedure for an MS 
initiated communication that is at Ready state. The MS was at Ready state when 
the FNI SNDCP did crash. The MS SNDCP sends DATA PDU to the FNI 
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indication is sent to the upper layer (o8). The consistency is restored now 
between FNI SNDCP and MS SNDCP and hence communication can continue 
as normal.   
 
Figure 18: Recovery for an FNI initiated communication (Standby) 
Figure 18 shows MSC for recovery procedure for an FNI initiated 
communication and the MS is currently at Standby state. On the reception of 
Data_Packet request from the upper layer (e6) , the FNI SNDCP enters recovery 
state because the state-event pair (e6, s1) is inconsistent with T and then calls 
Retrieve_Info_Element to retrieve state information (i2, i4, i5, i6) for the target 
MS. The FNI SNDCP uses both the retrieved state and time information 
“elem_age” to determine the state of the MS SNDCP, for example   the 
retrieved state may be Ready but the “elem_age” value implies that the MS 
SNDCP must be at Standby (case where MS SNDCP entity had timed out while 
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the FNI SNDCP entity is down). The FNI SNDCP enters Standby state, starts 
the Standby timer and executes t8 (assuming the MS location i4 is known) where 
the received packet is queued a6 and DATA_TRANSMIT_REQUEST PDU is 
sent in a request to MLE (o10). On the reception of Transmission_Report 
indication (e7), the FNI SNDCP entity executes transition t9 where Standby 
timer is stopped, Ready state is entered, the queued packet is sent in DATA 
PDU (o9) and finally Ready timer is started. The communication between the 
FNI SNDCP and that MS is now completely recovered and can resume as 
normal.     
 
Figure 19: Recovery for an FNI initiated communication (Ready) 
The MSC diagram in Figure 19 shows recovery procedure for an FNI 
initiated communication and the MS is currently at Ready state. On the 
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reception of Data_Packet request from the upper layer (e6), the FNI SNDCP 
enters recovery state because the state-event pair (e6, s1)  is inconsistent with T 
and then calls Retrieve_Info_Element to retrieve state information for the target 
MS. Based on the retrieved information, the FNI SNDCP enters Ready state, 
starts the Ready timer with value (i6 - elem_age of Ready state)   to synchronize 
with MS Ready timer and then executes  t11 where the received packet is passed 
down in a DATA PDU (o9). On the reception of Transmission_Report 
indication (e7), the FNI SNDCP entity executes state transition t10 where 
Packet_Delivery_Status indication is sent (o11) to inform the upper layer about 
the transfer of the packet and Ready timer is restarted. The MS SNDCP restarts 
in turn the Ready timer upon receiving the packet.  The communication is now 
recovered with that MS and the next Data_Packet request is processed as 
normal.  
Note that because the state transition based recovery is event-driven, that makes 
it very efficient regarding overhead for two reasons. First, the frequency of 
information saving during failure-free execution is kept minimal because 
information is only saved at the correct point of time as mentioned before.  
Second, the FNI entity only restores the consistency with each peer entity on 
MS upon the occurrence of first inconsistent state-event pair and not before i.e. 
any MS entity will be recovered only when there is a communication demand, 
so as a result the system as a whole will be recovered smoothly and gradually.  
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Chapter 6  
Experimental Testbed and Results 
Our aim is to develop a testbed for TETRA packet data where peer-to-peer 
communication can be generated between protocol entities on MSs and FNI.  
The STBR method is applied to the FNI entities to study failure recovery in 
FNI. We use an operational model approach to develop the testbed. By 
operational model, we mean that the testbed should to a large extent operate as 
the real system does regarding message exchange and timing, but only provide a 
restricted form of its functionality. For example, in real system the cell change 
procedure is started at the MAC layer where signal strength is continuously 
measured, and when a stronger signal is detected from a neighboring cell, then 
the MAC layer indicates to the upper layer the cell change. In this example, the 
signal measurement is not relevant, but the MAC layer should be able to 
indicate to the upper layer about cell change if that is required by the 
experiment. The evaluation of the recovery should be done from the end user 
point of view. Different criteria are of interest to judge the STBR method, first 
recovery time i.e. the average time to restore pre-failure performance, and 
second the reliability of the recovery process. Furthermore, the performance 
overhead incurred by the STBR during free-failure execution is also important. 
6.1 Testbed architecture 
The testbed consists of four PCs that are connected via Ethernet. The entire 
testbed architecture is depicted in Figure 20. Each of the machines has an 
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application and/or a task running on it. We use the word “task” to refer to a 
software module that is not part of the TETRA packet data standard. The 
testbed software consists of three applications, namely mobile_station (MS), 
Base_Station(BS) and Packet Data Server(PDS) and three tasks, namely 
Mobile_End_User (MEU), State_Info_Saver (SIS) and File_Packet_Sender 
(FPS). The following items describe each of these applications and tasks 
individually, explaining their functions and their implementation issues. 
1. Mobile_Station (MS): This application provides packet data services to the 
MS users. It implements SNDCP, MLE, LLC and MAC protocol entities of the 
TETRA packet data on MS side. The MS application is able to run hundreds of 
MSs concurrently where each MS runs as a single thread. Each MS thread 
provides packet data service to one single user. The MS application is 
implemented in C++ and consists of about 5,000 lines of code. It runs on 1600 
MHZ, 512 MB RAM PC with Microsoft Windows 2000. 
 
Figure 20: Overall architecture of TETRA packet data testbed 
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2. Base Station (BS): This application provides main services provided by the 
BS such as data channel allocation and time slot reservation. Each BS 
application is assigned a number of channels to serve the mobile stations in its 
own cell. The data transfer on wireless channels is imitated by data transfer on 
UDP socket connections. The BS application implements MAC protocol entity 
and an interface to socket layer for sending and receiving MAC PDUs. Multiple 
BS applications can be run concurrently on the same machine or different 
machines where each application is identified by a unique address which is a 
combination of IP address and socket number. Each BS has a fixed socket that 
is known for each MS in the cell. This socket acts as the common control 
channel in real system where any MS that is either at Idle or Standby state 
utilizes it to initiate communication with the FNI by using random access 
procedure. The MS that has more data to send/receive will be shortly instructed 
to move to another packet data channel (another socket) where it can transmit 
by reserved access. BS uses TDMA access scheme where the channel is divided 
into timeslots and is shared by multiple MSs, however, each MS may transmit 
during the timeslots granted by the BS. BS application is written using C and 
consists of about 2,500 lines of code. It runs on 500 MHZ, 128 MB RAM Linux 
PC.  
3. Packet Data Server (PDS): This application implements the main 
functionalities of the LLC, MLE and SNDCP protocol entities in the FNI. The 
PDS application communicates with every BS application and it provides 
packet data services to all mobile stations created by the MS application.    The 
PDS application sends LLC requests to the MAC entity at BS and receives 
indications from BS through socket interface.  The PDS application has a 
known socket where any BS can forward the received MAC PDUs from MSs. 
The PDS in turn sends LLC PDUs in request primitives to the BSs. Each entity 
of the PDS is implemented as a single thread where inter-communication is 
done through messages via SAP primitives. The PDS application is written in C 
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and consists of about 5,000 lines of code. It runs on 548 MHZ, 256 MB RAM 
Linux PC. 
4. State Information Saver (SIS): This server task enables FNI entities to easily 
save their state information according to the recovery protocol developed in 
section 5.3. The client (FNI entity) needs to link to an SIS library in order to 
have access to the protocol function calls. The FNI entities communicate with 
SIS server through sockets.   The SIS has a known socket at which the PDS 
application entities can send the requests defined by the STBR recovery 
protocol. The SIS server task is implemented in C (about 800 lines of code) and 
runs on a separate 500 MHZ, 128 MB RAM Linux PC. 
5. Mobile End-User (MEU):  This is a simple task that uses the packet data 
services provided by the MS application. There is one MEU task associated 
with every MS. Each MEU task can request its MS to download files from a 
destination PC. The MEU  tasks has several functionalities such as converting 
files into packets to be delivered to SNDCP entity for transmission, assembling 
received packets from SNDCP entity into files, add/verify file checksum, file 
retransmission, generating different traffic and mobility patterns, collecting 
experimental statistics, etc. The MEU is written in C++ (about 700 lines of 
code) runs on the same Windows machine where the MS application runs. 
6. File_Packet_Sender (FPS): This is the task that handles the file download 
requests issued by the MEU tasks. The FPS task owns a number of files of 
different sizes. The requested file is converted into packets that are sent to the 
PDS application. The FPS task has a known socket where PDS can deliver 
messages. The FPS task is implemented in C (about 600 lines of code) and  runs 
on the same machine where SIS runs but it may also run on a separate linux 
machine. 
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6.2 Experiment procedure and configuration 
Our intention is to test the STBR method on the PDS application. The idea is to 
force the PDS application to crash and then study its recovery as perceived by 
the MEU tasks.  Therefore, the PDS application is linked to the SIS library to 
enable PDS entities to register to the SIS and save their state information. 
Furthermore, the code of the PDS is updated according to the STBR method, 
where the finite state machine code of SNDCP, MLE and LLC entities are 
updated to handle Recovery state. Every place in the code where it is necessary 
to save/retrieve state information is identified and Save_Info_Element/ 
Retrieve_Info_Element calls are added. 
Let us first describe the communication flow that takes place in the testbed.  
Each MEU task uses its MS to periodically send file download request to FPS 
task. But before sending any user data, every MS needs to create PDP context 
activation with the PDS application. If file downloading is not started after 5 
seconds, the MEU task retransmits the file download request. Once the FPS task 
receives the file download request, it converts the requested file into packets 
and sends them one by one to the PDS SNDCP entity. The FPS task sends the 
next packet upon receiving Packet_Delivery_Status indication with transfer 
status “success” from the PDS SNDCP (refer to 5.4.1). The PDS SNDCP entity 
adds a header to every packet and forwards it as an SDU to the MLE entity 
which in turn adds a header and forwards it to LLC entity. The LLC entity 
divides the received SDU into segments (maximum size of 231 bits each) and a 
header containing SDU number and segment number is added to each segment. 
The LLC entity then requests the BS application to reserve time slots for all 
segments in hand. On reception of slots grants from the BS, the LLC entity 
sends each segment in a timeslot to the BS. The BS application forwards the 
segments to the appropriate MS. The MS MAC entity receives the segments 
through the socket and forwards them to the LLC entity. The MS LLC entity 
assembles the received segments (after removing headers) into a complete SDU 
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that is forwarded to the MLE entity. The MLE entity removes its header and 
then forwards the SDU to the SNDCP entity.  The MS SNDCP entity extracts 
the packet and delivers it to the MEU task. The MEU task collects all the 
packets and reconstructs the file, calculates file checksum, measure download 
time, etc. 
The testbed setup that is used to conduct experiments consists of 2 BSs where 
each BS is assigned a number of data channels enough to carry the data load in 
experiments. Each data channel has a gross bit rate of 28 Kbit/sec. Two file 
sizes are used for experiments 24 and 40 KB, the ideal download time are bout 
7 and 11 seconds respectively, while actual time is about twice of that. The 
number of MSs in each cell and the address information to access BSs can be 
entered in the MS application interface shown in Figure 21.  Cell change rate is 
set to 10% i.e. about 10% of MSs will move to the other BS every minute.  
 
Figure 21: The MS application user interface 
Each failure recovery experiment begins by  starting all applications and tasks 
and when the workload reaches steady state(also known as stationary state)  i.e. 
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the average number of packets received by all MEU tasks is relatively stable, a 
Kill signal is sent at a random instant of time to cause the crash of the PDS 
application. The PDS application is then restarted after a short time period 
between 5-15 seconds to compensate for fault detection time. The recovery of 
the PDS application is then assessed by its effect on MEU tasks both with 
respect to performance (download time) and correctness (download success).  
 
6.3 Experiments 
We conducted 3 sets of experiments. In the first set of experiments 
there are 50 MSs in both cells and on average one MS is context activated every 
1 second. Therefore, it takes about 50*1 seconds to create all PDP context 
activations i.e. every single MS in the experiment can send and receive data 
(possibly all together at the same time). Once an MS completes PDP context 
activation, its associated MEU task issues a file download request within 30 
seconds requesting the FPS task to download a 40 KB file size by simply 
picking a random number between 0 and 30. Upon the reception of all file 
packets, the MEU task calculates both file checksum to check its integrity and 
the download time. The MEU task then picks again a random number between 0 
and 30 seconds to issue a new file download request. In other words, each MEU 
task will on average send a new file download request after 15 seconds from 
finishing the latest file download.  The MEU task keeps downloading files until 
a selected number set by the experiment is reached. The total number of 
completely downloaded files, number of packets and the average file download 
time during each time unit is computed for every MEU task. The time unit used 
in the experiments is 10 seconds. The average file download time is the average 
of download times of all files that completed downloading in the same time 
unit. Note that the beginning and the end of file download can not occur in the 
same time unit unless the download time is less than the time unit.  
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Figure 22: 3 typical failure-free experiments in set #1: (a) Number of downloaded 
files per time unit for each experiment run; (b) The corresponding number of 
packets; (c) The average download time of 40 KB file. 
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Figure 22(a) shows the number of downloaded files for 3 representative 
experiments in set #1 during failure-free run. A run in which the PDS 
application does not crash is called a failure-free run. The number of files that 
finish downloading within the same time unit is found for the entire experiment 
run and the results are shown as solid curve. As can be seen from the graph, the 
number of file download completions per unit time is zero at the beginning of 
each experiment. In the first period of the experiment, the number increases 
rapidly as more MSs create PDP contexts and thus more MEU tasks start 
downloading files. In the second period, the number fluctuates around 14 files. 
In the third and final period, the number declines to zero as more MEU tasks 
stop downloading because they reached the selected number of files. The 
dashed curve shows the mean number of downloaded files for all these three 
experiments. Each MEU task downloads 5 files and then stops so the total 
number of downloaded files in each experiment in set #1 is 50*5 files. Each 
experiment takes about 250 seconds from the beginning to the end. Figure 22(b) 
shows the corresponding number of packets received by all MEU tasks in each 
time unit for these three experiments. The 40 KB file is equivalent to 28 packets 
of maximum size of 1500 bytes so the number of downloaded packets in each 
experiment in set #1 is 50*5*28 packets. The total number of received packets 
per unit time increases in the first period of the experiment then fluctuates 
around 400 in the second period and finally declines in the final period. The 
dashed curve is the mean number of packets across all the three experiments 
together. The average file download time during these 3 experiments is shown 
in  Figure 22(c). As it can be seen from the figure, it takes about 20 seconds to 
download the 40 KB file from the FPS task to any MEU task during failure-free 
run and it is almost constant. As previously mentioned, we intend to induce 
failure while the workload is at steady state. The steady state as it can be clearly 
seen from the mean curves in  is reached after about 70 seconds from the 
experiment beginning - when the number of packets is around 400 and 
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downloaded files is 14 - and sustain about 100 seconds. The steady state load 
(packets per unit time) can be calculated by using this simple formula:  
downloadsbetweentimeaveragetimedownloadfile
unittimepacketsinsizefileMSsofNumberloadSteady
+
×
×=
 
Thus the expected steady state load in set #1 is about 50 * (28 * 10/ 20+15) = 
400 packets per unit time which is equivalent to about 14 files per unit time. 
The calculated steady state value matches well with the value obtained from the 
mean (dashed curve) across all the three experiments. It can be also deduced 
from the calculation that at steady state there will be around 14 MEU tasks 
downloading simultaneously.     
  
In the second set of experiments there are 100 MSs, and the context activation 
occurs at a rate of one MS every 0.5 second in order to keep the 50 seconds 
period to complete all PDP context activations. Each MEU task downloads the 
40 KB file 5 times from the PC running the FPS task. Once the MEU task 
receives the whole file, it picks a random number between 0 and 30 seconds to 
start the next file download. Figure 23 (a) shows the number of downloaded 
files per unit time for 3 representative failure-free experimental runs in set #2. 
As can be seen from the graph, the number of file download completions per 
unit time increases from 0 to about 30 files in the first period, then fluctuates 
around 30 files in the second period and finally decreases to 0 in the third and 
final period. Each experiment takes about 260 seconds and performs 100*5 file 
downloads. Figure 23 (b) shows the corresponding number of packets received 
during each time unit of the three experiments. The total number of packets 
received by all MEU tasks during each experiment in set #2 is 100*5*28, where 
28 is the size of the 40 KB file in packets.    The average file download time 
during all these 3 runs is shown in Figure 23 (c). The average file download 
time is about 20 seconds, exactly the same as in set #1. As can be seen from the  
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Figure 23: 3 typical failure-free experiments in set #2: (a) Number of 
downloaded files per time unit for each experiment run; (b) The corresponding 
number of packets; (c) The average download time of 40 KB file. 
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mean curve, the steady state is reached between 70 and 170 seconds of the 
experiment time during which the number of packets per unit time is around 
800 and the number of downloaded files is between 25 and 30. The expected 
steady state load of experiments in set #2 can be calculated as follows:  
100 * (28 * 10/ 20+15) = 800 packets per unit time or about 28 files per unit 
time. That’s again match good with the mean curve for the three experiments. 
Consequently, the number of MEU tasks that will download simultaneously at 
steady state is about 28.  The steady state load in experiments of set #2 is the 
double of that in set #1 as a result of doubling the number of MSs. 
 
In the third set of experiments there are 200 MSs, and the context activation 
occurs at a rate of one MS every 0.25 second. Each MEU task downloads a 24 
KB file 5 times from the PC running the FPS task. Once the MEU task receives 
the whole file, it issues a new file download request within 20 seconds by 
simply picking a random number between 0 and 40 seconds. Figure 24(a) 
displays the number of the number of downloaded files per unit time for three 
representative experiments in set #3. In each experiment run, 200*5 files are 
downloaded from the FPS task during a period of about 260 seconds.  The 
dashed curve plots the mean number of downloaded files across all the three 
experiments. Figure 24(b) displays the number of received file packets per unit 
time for the three experiments. The total number of packets which is 
downloaded during every experiment is 200*5*16, where 16 is the size of the 
24 KB file in packets. The dashed curve displays the mean number of packets 
for these three experiments. Finally, Figure 24(c) shows the average file 
download time for the three experiments. The average download time for the 24 
KB file is about 12 seconds and is relatively constant throughout all the three 
experiments. The two mean curves for files and packets indicate that that the 
steady state is reached after 70 seconds i.e. when the number of packets is 
around 1000 and files around 60, and it lasts about 7 time units before the  
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Figure 24: 3 typical failure-free experiments in set #3: (a) Number of 
downloaded files per time unit for each experiment run; (b) The corresponding 
number of packets; (c) The average download time of 24 KB file. 
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curves start declining. The expected number of packets per unit time at steady 
state load can be calculated as follows:  
200 * (16 * 10/ 12+20) = 1000 packets per unit time or about 62 files per unit 
time. That’s again very close to the mean curve for the three representative 
experiments. Accordingly, the number of MSs that will transmit simultaneously 
at steady state is going to be around 62. The steady state load in experiment set 
#2 is about 25% higher than in set #2. 
6.3.1 Failure recovery in experiment set #1  
 
To test the failure recovery of the PDS application in the first set of 
experiments, we intend to force the PDS application to fail by sending a Kill 
signal while the load is at steady state and then restart it after a short period of 
time to compensate for the failure detection latency. Figure 25 shows 3 
representative experiments where the Kill signal is issued at around 75, 95 and 
115 seconds from the experiment beginning respectively and the PDS is 
restarted after 5 seconds. The instant of the PDS crash may deviate about ± 1 
second from the mentioned values.  Figure 25 (a) displays the effect of the 5 
seconds failure period on the number of files downloaded by the MEU tasks. 
For the sake of comparison, the dashed curve which plots the mean number of 
downloaded files for the three previous failure-free experiments in set #1 is 
added to the graph.  The number of file download completions per unit time for 
all three experiments drops from about 14 to lower than 5 files and then rises 
sharply to over 20 files right after the PDS restart as can be seen. 
Correspondingly, the number of received packets per unit time falls from about 
400 to around 100 packets and then rise sharply to over 400 after the PDS 
restart as it can be seen in Figure 25 (b).  The sharp rise in the number of files 
and packets is the result of the fact that the number of MEU tasks that  
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Figure 25: Failure recovery in set #1 for 3 sample experiments where PDS 
application crashed around 75, 95 and 115 seconds respectively and then restarted 
after 5 seconds 
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downloads simultaneously will increase after failure. Every MEU task that was 
downloading when the PDS crashed besides any new one that tried to download 
while the PDS is down will retransmit file download request if no file packet is 
received within 5 seconds. The peak of the first experiment indicates that the 
number of MEU tasks that downloads simultaneously right after the PDS restart 
is almost reaching 25, and it exceeds 20 for the second and third experiment. 
We refer to the experiment killed at 75 second as the first experiment, the 
experiment killed at 95 second as the second experiment, etc. Figure 25 (c) 
shows the variation in the average file download time for these 3 experiments. 
The average file download time is increased from 20 to about 30 seconds after 
failure and then drops back to 20 seconds within 4 time units from the PDS 
restart. The average file download can clearly indicate when the impact of 
failure is removed and the performance is restored. 
As can be seen from these experiments, the PDS application eliminates 
completely the impact of the failure within 40 seconds from its restart. It is also 
obvious to see that after 4 time units from the sharp rise all three sample 
experiments tend to re-follow the mean curve nicely. Note that the PDS 
application starts servicing correctly immediately after its restart but it takes 
about 40 seconds to eliminate the impact of the failure on the mobile end users. 
Furthermore, we control the success of the failure recovery in each experiment 
in set #1 by checking that the total number of downloaded files and packets 
must be equal to 50*5 files and 50*5*28 packets which correspond to the values 
obtained under failure-free experiment. Finally we should mention that our 
procedure of testing and measuring failure recovery is not something that is 
adopted by the fault tolerance research community nor do we know to any 
specific procedure but we find our procedure to be very logical and practical.       
In the same manner, we conducted experiments where the PDS is restarted after 
15 seconds instead of 5. Figure 26 shows 3 typical experiments where the PDS  
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 Figure 26: Failure recovery in set #1 for 3 sample experiments where PDS 
application crashed around 75, 95 and 115 seconds respectively and then restarted 
after 15 seconds 
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application is killed at around 75, 95 and 115 seconds respectively and then 
restarted after 15 seconds. The number of downloaded files drops from around 
14 before the PDS crash to zero when the PDS is down for all three experiments 
as can be seen in Figure 26 (a). The number of files then rises sharply to around 
30 files right after PDS restart in the first and second experiment. That also 
indicates that the number of MEU tasks that are downloading simultaneously is 
increased to about the double right after the PDS restart. In parallel to the 
number of downloaded files, the number of packets drops from about 400 to 
zero during the PDS downtime. The number of packets then rises sharply to 
around 500 packets to service the increasing number of MEU tasks requesting 
file downloads. Figure 26(c) displays the average file download time calculated 
on the MEU tasks during these 3 experiments. The average file download time 
increases from 20 to 40 seconds. The average file download time peak is 
increased by 10 seconds (from 30 to 40) relative to the 5 seconds downtime case 
which match very well with the 10 seconds increase in the PDS downtime.   
The average file download time is set to zero in the time unit where no file 
download completion is counted. The PDS application eliminates the impact of 
failure within 40 seconds from its restart as can be seen. It is clear to see from 
these sample experiments that the PDS handles the burst of messages coming 
from MSs after its restart well and within 4 time units it returns back to the 
steady state level. The experiment takes few more time units than the failure-
free run to finish as can be noticed because of the crash and downtime. It is 
quiet good that the increase in the PDS downtime has no negative impact on the 
recovery time but the end users will of course observe longer delay.    
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6.3.2 Failure recovery in experiment set #2 
In the second set of experiments, the number of MSs is increased to 100; file 
size is 40 KB and a new file download is initiated within 30 after the previous 
file download is finished. Figure 27 shows the experimental data for three 
representative experiments where the PDS application is killed at around 75, 95 
and 115 seconds respectively and then restarted after 5 seconds. As can be seen 
from Figure 27(a) the average number of downloaded files drops from about 30 
to fewer than 10 files per unit time during the PDS crash and then rise to over 
40 files right after the PDS restart. The dashed curve displays the mean number 
of files for the previous three failure-free experiments in set #2. Figure 27(b) 
shows the corresponding number of packets per unit time for these three 
experiments. The number of packets drops from about 800 to less than 200 
packet per unit time as a result of the PDS crash. The number of packets then 
rises sharply to about 1000 right after the PDS restart.  The average file 
download time as can be seen in Figure 27(c) increase from 20 seconds before 
PDS crash to about 30 seconds after  PDS restart and then goes back to 20 
seconds within 4 time units.  That is exactly the same to what happens in 
experiment set #1 after 5 seconds downtime. As can be seen from these sample 
experiments in set #2, the PDS is still able to handle recovery quickly and 
successfully although the workload is increased to the double of that in set #1. 
The success of the failure recovery is also controlled for every experiment in set 
#2 by checking that the total number of downloaded files and packets must be 
equal to 100*5 files and 100*5*28 packets which correspond to the values 
obtained under failure-free experiments.     
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Figure 27: Failure recovery in set #2 for 3 sample experiments where PDS 
application crashed around 75, 95 and 115 seconds respectively and then restarted 
after 5 seconds 
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More experiments were conducted for set #2, but now the PDS downtime is 
prolonged to 15 seconds. Figure 28 shows three representative experiments in 
set #2, during which the PDS application  is crashed around 75, 95 and 115 
seconds and then restarted after 15 seconds. As can be seen in Figure 28(a), the 
number of downloaded files drops from about 28 before the PDS crash to zero 
during the PDS downtime. The number of packets then jumps to between 50 
and 60 files after the PDS restart.  The peaks in the second and third 
experiment, for example, indicate that there are about 60 MSs that are 
transmitting simultaneously right after the PDS restart. Figure 28(b) shows the 
corresponding number of packets per unit time for these three experiments. The 
number of packets drops from around the 800 packets reached at the steady 
state to zero and then rise to around 1000 packets right after the PDS restart. 
The average file download time is zero during the PDS downtime because no 
file download completion is counted and then increases to 40 seconds right after 
the PDS start as be seen in Figure 28(c). The average file download time then 
drops back to 20 seconds within 4 time units. As we can see again, the PDS 
promptly resumes servicing all MSs that were in the middle of file downloading 
or requesting new downloads right after its restart and within 40 seconds the 
impact of the failure is cleared out. That is obvious to see from the average file 
download time but it can also be seen in the number of files and packets 
because after 4 time units from PDS restart, each experiment tends to re-follow 
the course of the mean curve which actually represents the failure-free 
execution of the PDS. 
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Figure 28: Failure recovery in set #2 for 3 sample experiments where PDS 
application crashed around 75, 95 and 115 seconds respectively and then restarted 
after 15 seconds 
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6.3.3 Failure recovery in experiment set #3 
In the third set of experiments, the number of MSs is increased to 200, 
file size is 24 KB and new file download request is issued within 40 seconds 
after the previous download finished. Figure 29 shows three typical experiments 
in set #3 during which the PDS application is forced to crash at around 75, 95 
and 115 seconds respectively, and then restarted after 5 seconds.   Figure 29(a) 
shows the number of files that are downloaded by MEU tasks from the FPS task 
throughout all these experiments. The dashed curve is the mean number of files 
obtained previously for three failure-free experiments in set #3. As can be seen, 
the number of downloaded files drops from about 60 files per unit time at 
steady load to less than 30 during the PDS downtime. The number of 
downloaded files then jumps to over 100 files right after the restart indicating an 
increase of the traffic load after the crash. For example, the peak in the first 
experiment indicates that there are about 120 MSs transmitting simultaneously 
i.e. about the double of what it is at steady state load. Figure 29 (b) shows the 
corresponding number of packets received by MEU tasks throughout all these 
three experiments. The number of packets drops from about 1000 packets per 
unit time reached at the steady state to fewer than 400 during the PDS 
downtime and then rise sharply to between 1200 and 1600 right after the PDS 
restart. Figure 29(c) plots the average file download time throughout all these 
three experiments. The average file download time as can be seen increases 
from 12 seconds before the PDS crash to about 22 and then drops back to 12 
seconds within 4 time units. The PDS shows again the ability to perform a full 
recovery within 40 seconds from its restart following a 5 seconds downtime. It 
is also clear to see that both the number of downloaded files and packets re-
follows the mean curve nicely after 4 time units from the PDS restart. The 
different file size and download rate that is used for experiments in set #3 has 
not effected the fast and successful recovery. The success of the failure recovery 
for each experiment is controlled by checking that the total number of  
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Figure 29: Failure recovery in set #3 for 3 sample experiments where PDS 
application crashed around 75, 95 and 115 seconds respectively and then restarted 
after 5 seconds 
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downloaded files and packets must be equal to 200*5 files and 200*5*16 
packets which are equal to the values obtained under failure-free experiment. 
Further experiments in set #3 were conducted with the PDS downtime 
being increased to 15 seconds. Figure 30 shows three typical experiments in set 
#3, during which the PDS application  is crashed around 75, 95 and 115 seconds 
and then restarted after 15 seconds. As can be seen in Figure 30(a), the number 
of file download completions per unit time drops from about 60 files reached at 
steady load before the PDS crash to zero during the PDS downtime. The 
number of downloaded files then rises sharply to more than 140 as in the first 
and third experiment which indicates that there are more than 140 MSs 
transmitting simultaneously right after the PDS restart. The number of packet 
received per unit time by the MEU tasks during the course of these experiments 
is shown in Figure 30(b). The number of packets drops from about 1000 packet 
per unit time before the PDS crash to zero during the PDS down time. After the 
PDS restart, the number of packets jumps to around 1600 packet per unit time 
as can be seen in these three experiments. The average download for the 24 KB 
file is increased from 12 seconds before the PDS crash to about 32 seconds after 
the PDS restart as can be seen in Figure 30(c). The average file download time 
then falls down to 12 seconds within 40 seconds from the PDS restart. As we 
can see again the impact of the failure is cleared out by the PDS after 4 time 
units from its restart. It is also to clear to see that packet and downloaded file 
curves for all three experiments re-follows very nicely the course of their 
respective mean curve after 4 time units the PDS restart. The experiment 
duration, however, will take about two more time units to finish than the failure-
free run as can be noticed.          
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  Figure 30: Failure recovery in set #3 for 3 sample experiments where PDS 
application crashed around 75, 95 and 115 seconds respectively and then restarted 
after 15 seconds 
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6.3.4 Failure-free overhead 
 We used the Linux “top” command to measure the overhead that the STBR 
method caused on PDS application during failure free execution i.e. the cost of 
saving and updating the PDS state information on the SIS. To do that, the CPU 
usage of the PDS application is read by “top” at an interval of 10 seconds 
during failure-free run for a number of experiments in every experiment set.  
We then replaced the PDS application with the original one that is not updated 
with STBR and repeated the same procedure. Figure 31 shows two experiments 
in set #3, in the first experiment the PDS runs with STBR but in the second 
experiment STBR is not used. As can be seen, the first experiment uses the 
CPU slightly more than the second one. The highest CPU usage in the first 
experiment is 4.7% and 4.5% in the second so the overhead is about 4.4 % in 
this example. The accuracy in the decimal portion of the results may be not 
good but this is not very significant.  During all conducted experiments, the 
overhead never exceeded 5% in all experiment sets. This is a low overhead as 
we previously expected due to the non-blocking socket mode and client/server 
model used by the STBR. 
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Figure 31: The PDS CPU time usage of two experiments in set #3. The PDS in the 
first experiment is updated with STBR method but not in the second. 
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6.4 Experiments summary 
Table 6-1 shows a summary of the three experimental sets and the 
achieved results. 
As far as we can see from these results and hundreds of other experiments that 
we conducted, the STBR method proofed to be able to achieve fast and 
successful recovery. In each experiment of these three sets and no matter if the 
PDS downtime is 5 or 15 seconds, the PDS could promptly resume service after 
its restart and 40 seconds later the impact of the crash failure disappeared. 
Furthermore the failure-free overhead found to be less than 5% for all 
experiments where the CPU usage is measured and there were no apparent 
difference between sets. There were cases where the PDS application did crash 
during the recovery but after every investigation and hard debugging work it 
always turned up to be an implementation error somewhere in the testbed 
software and had nothing to do with the STBR method.  
 
Experiments Set #1 Set #2 Set #3 
Number of MSs 50 100 200 
File size (KB) 40 40 24 
Time to next file download (sec) random[0,30] random[0,30] random[0,40] 
Average file download time (sec) 20 20 12 
Failure downtime (sec) 5 15 5 15 5 15 
Highest average file download time 
during failure recovery (sec) 
30 40 30 40 22 32 
Recovery time (time units) 4 4 4 4 4 4 
 
Table 6-1: Summary of the failure recovery experiments 
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Chapter 7  
Conclusions and Discussion 
7.1 Conclusions 
The use of mobile data services is increasing rapidly due to its huge 
potential to offer effective solutions to various tasks in many sectors, e.g. public 
safety, transportation, public health, etc. Consequently, the demand for highly 
reliable and available data services is expected to be a top priority as users rely 
more and more on data services to perform their work, especially in the security 
and public safety fields. 
The goal of our research was to develop a failure recovery method that 
can be used to achieve high availability in mobile data communications 
systems. We reviewed the best known recovery methods in fault tolerance 
research and pointed out their general limitations. We then analyzed the 
characteristics of mobile data communications systems and based on that a 
number of requirements that need to be fulfilled by any recovery method are 
determined. Our major contribution in this thesis is the development of the State 
Transition based Recovery (STBR) method. The STBR is a novel failure 
recovery method that is based on behavioral model of the communication 
protocols. The behavior of the communication protocol is modeled by our 
adapted Communicating Extended Finite State Machine (CEFSM). We took 
TETRA packet data as a concrete case study and   implemented an experimental 
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testbed to generate the communication traffic between mobile stations and the 
fixed network infrastructure in accordance to the TETRA standard. 
The results of the experiments we conducted on the testbed were very 
encouraging. The PDS application of the infrastructure which is updated with 
STBR could instantly resume servicing mobile users when it restarts after its 
crash as if no failure had happened. Furthermore, the PDS application was able 
to clear out the impact of its failure on mobile users in less than a minute from 
its restart. In addition, the performance overhead caused by the STBR during 
failure-free execution was experimentally found to be less than 5%. Based on 
these promising results, we belief that high availability (five nines) can be 
technically achieved in mobile data communication by using the STBR method 
combined with a quick failure detection mechanism. The high availability can 
still be maintained even in the presence of permanent faults in the code as long 
as they are not activated too often as it is normally the case for reliable software. 
We can not directly compare our work with other works for many 
reasons. For example it is not useful to compare it with rollback or replication 
based recovery methods because they do not work if the fault is permanent. In 
case of N-version, we would need to implement at least 3 versions of the PDS 
application by different teams and then forward messages coming from BS 
application to all versions, and moreover find a way to vote between messages 
issued from all PDS versions. This is a huge task which requires both resources 
and time knowing that it took us no less than 200 workdays to implement the 
PDS application alone. Even then, we suspect that the N-version or other failure 
recovery methods can meet the real time requirements. We actually do not 
know any comparative study between the different existing methods.   This is 
probably a shortage from a scientific point of view, but we believe that it will be 
technically difficult to compare these different methods on experimental level. 
Finally, in order to compare the STBR with a customized solution that is used 
by a commercial communication system, we need first to implement STBR in 
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that system then try to compare these two solutions. That could be a goal for a 
future project.      
We have learned many lessons during the many thousands of hours we 
used in designing and implementing the applications for the TETRA testbed, 
then adding STBR, and finally testing and fixing the problems. Based on our 
previous experience in developing real time embedded communication systems, 
we estimate that these lessons can be very valuable for communication software 
development. We discovered during testing the recovery of the PDS application 
that many bugs and unforeseen scenarios are more likely to show up because 
the application is exposed to any event at any instant of time. The root causes of 
these problems are different e.g. design, coding, misinterpretation, or lack of the 
specifications in the standard. The specifications in any communication 
standard can not count for all possible scenarios that can occur in the real 
system and is not supposed to do that. The last and final details fall on the 
shoulders of the software developers to treat them.  Applying STBR thus can 
aid in performing very thorough test and consequently save a lot of problems 
before they may be discovered later in the field. We also found out that the 
specifications of the communications standards (at least TETRA) are flexible 
enough to contain the STBR method. We have not met with any scenario that 
was impossible to recover or required a protocol modification. We believe that 
this will be the case for every well designed protocol.    
7.2 Pros and cons 
In this section, we try to discuss the benefits, disadvantages and opportunities of 
using the STBR method as we see it.  
The STBR method is a white box approach that requires knowledge 
about the application to be recovered. The main disadvantage of choosing this 
approach is that the burden of handling recovery is placed on the system 
designer and application programmer. However, because the model based 
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STBR method uses the white box approach it can save the minimum amount of 
information at the lowest frequency and thus a minimum performance overhead 
with lowest impact on real-time communication.  
The cost of applying STBR to the communication systems is expected 
to be between low and middle. There are different reasons to support this 
expectation.  As a rule of thumb, the cost to design, implement and test a 
protocol entity is proportional to the size of its finite state machine determined 
by the number of states and input events. Extending state transition diagram 
with one extra “Recovery” state will imply more designs scenarios, more code 
and more test cases, but this increase will not become significantly high. With 
respect to the cost of hardware, it is also moderate due to the fact that STBR 
adopts 2N and N+1 redundancy.  
Furthermore, the autonomous recovery principle gives the flexibility to select 
only the most critical entities or nodes and add STBR capabilities to them.  
The ability to recover quickly and reliably from failures will not only 
improve the availability of the system but it will also make it easier for failure 
detection technique to judge if the system is operational or not. The failure 
detection mechanism may early initiate failure recovery procedure by relying on 
the fast and successful recovery of the STBR. 
 The STBR method opens the opportunity for “hot update” technology 
by analogy with “hot swap” for hardware. In other words, it may be possible to 
replace the running infrastructure application with a newer version that 
immediately continues to service the mobile users in the field after retrieving 
their state information from the SIS.  
Finally, the STBR method has one more strong advantage which is 
portability as the method does not depend on any type of hardware or operating 
system. This gives the designers the free choice to choose the hardware and 
software that meet their requirements. This is not the case for the rollback and 
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replication based methods because the accompanied middleware is usually 
written for a specific operating system and hardware.  
 
7.3 Discussion 
Should we live with system down time in the range of hours per year? 
Or try to develop systems with downtime in the range of minutes? Should we 
stick to the traditional way of designing and implementing communication 
systems? Or should we take the additional step and the associated risks? This is 
a difficult decision to make and this decision probably concerns system 
designers and developers more than project managers. But there is always a risk 
by introducing new technology. 
Based on our experience, we believe that the most effective approach to 
develop communication systems is to select the best methods from the 
beginning. Trying to have a system up and running very quickly to reduce time-
to-market and then finally fix the issues of availability and reliability may not 
lead to the shortest time in the long run. The consequences can be high 
development and maintenance costs, damaged reputation, and a final system 
filled with patches with no way to the optimal solution.  
The problem here is that it is impossible to foresee the number 
problems and their size ahead, and when the system is declared to be ready for 
operation how one can determine if the developed system could had been better 
both with respect to quality (availability and reliability) and cost. To do that, we 
need to re-build the system with different approach and methods and then do the 
comparison. That is not realistic, and the common answer is that there is always 
place for improvement.       
Finally, what is the chance for adopting the STBR in a commercial data 
communications system? This is an interesting question that we frankly can not 
give a direct answer to.  But the best candidate would be a new started project 
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that has availability and reliability as top priorities and  ready to follow the key 
principles of building high available system i.e. redundancy, modularity, 
detection and failure recovery. There is no doubt that customers need high 
availability and reliability communication systems. However, while no such 
system is yet in place, customers can not exert hard pressure on system 
suppliers but have to live with what exists.  
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Appendix A. SNDCP PDU formats 
 
This appendix lists the PDUs of the TETRA SNDCP protocol and their 
contents [ETSI03]. 
Table A-1: SN-ACTIVATE PDP CONTEXT DEMAND PDU   
Field name Length(bits) 
SN PDU type 4 
SNDCP version 4 
NSAPI 4 
Address type identifier in demand 3 
IP Address IPv4 32 
Packet data MS Type 4 
PCOMP negotiation 8 
Number of Van Jacobson compression state slots 8  
Number of compression state slots, TCP 8  
Number of compression state slots, non-TCP 16 
Maximum interval between full headers 8 
Maximum time interval between full headers 8 
Largest header size in octets that may be compressed 8 
Access point name index 16 
DCOMP negotiation varies 
Protocol configuration options varies 
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Table A-2: SN-ACTIVATE PDP CONTEXT ACCEPT PDU  
Field name Length(bits) 
SN PDU type 4 
NSAPI  4  
PDU priority max 3  
READY timer  4  
STANDBY timer  4  
RESPONSE_WAIT timer 4  
Type identifier in accept 3  
IP Address IPv4  32  
PCOMP negotiation 8  
Number of Van Jacobson compression state slots  8  
Number of compression state slots, TCP  8  
Number of compression state slots, non-TCP 16 
Maximum interval between full headers 8  
Maximum time interval between full headers 8  
Largest header size in octets that may be compressed 8  
Maximum transmission unit  3  
SNDCP network endpoint identifier  16  
FNI IPv6 information  98  
FNI Mobile IPv4 information 71  
DCOMP negotiation  varies  
Protocol configuration options varies  
 
Table A-3: SN-ACTIVATE PDP CONTEXT REJECT PDU  
Field name Length(bits) 
SN PDU type 4 
NSAPI 4 
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Activation reject cause 8 
Protocol configuration options varies 
 
 
 
Table A-4: SN-DATA PDU  
Field name Length(bits) 
SN PDU type 4 
NSAPI 4 
PCOMP 4 
DCOMP 4 
N-PDU varies 
 
Table A-5: SN-DATA TRANSMIT REQUEST PDU  
Field name Length(bits) 
SN PDU type 4 
NSAPI 4 
Logical link status 1 
Enhanced service 1 
Resource request varies 
SNDCP network endpoint identifier 16 
Reserved 20 
 
 
Table A-6: SN-DATA TRANSMIT RESPONSE PDU  
Field name Length(bits) 
SN PDU type 4 
NSAPI 4 
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Accept/Reject 1 
Transmit response reject cause 8 
SNDCP network endpoint identifier 16 
 
 
Table A-7: SN-DEACTIVATE PDP CONTEXT DEMAND 
Field name Length(bits) 
SN PDU type 4 
Deactivation type 8 
NSAPI 4 
SNDCP network endpoint identifier 16 
Reserved 12 
 
 
Table A-8: SN-DEACTIVATE PDP CONTEXT ACCEPT PDU  
Field name Length(bits) 
SN PDU type 4 
Deactivation type 8 
NSAPI 4 
SNDCP network endpoint identifier 16 
Reserved 11 
 
Table A-9: SN-PAGE REQUEST PDU  
Field name Length(bits) 
SN PDU type 4 
NSAPI 4 
Reply requested 1 
SNDCP network endpoint identifier 16  
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Table A-10: SN-RECONNECT PDU 
SN PDU type 4 
Data to send 1 
NSAPI 4 
Enhanced service 1 
Resource request variable 
SNDCP network endpoint identifier 16 
Reserved 19 
 
 
 
Table A-11: SN-END OF DATA 
Field name Length(bits) 
SN PDU type 4 
Immediate service change 1 
Reserved 4 
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